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RESUMO 
RODRIGUEZ, Monica Rebelo, Análise de Competição em Licitações Brasileiras de Áreas de 
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo. Departamento de Engenharia de Petróleo: Faculdade de 
Engenharia Mecânica, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2010. 185 p. Tese de Doutorado. 
Há 10 anos da quebra do monopólio para a exploração e produção (E&P) de petróleo no Brasil o 
mercado se mostrou estável, competitivo e gerando resultados positivos que atraem o interesse 
das companhias nacionais e estrangeiras a investir no setor de “upstream”. O processo de cessão 
de direitos e obrigações sobre as áreas de E&P é conduzido pela Agência Nacional de Petróleo, 
Gás Natural e Bio-combustíveis (ANP) por meio de licitação pública, com regras bem definidas, 
onde o vencedor assina um contrato de concessão com a ANP. Esta pesquisa apresenta e analisa o 
histórico destas licitações para áreas de exploração e produção e áreas inativas com acumulações 
marginais, dentro do cenário econômico brasileiro e do potencial exploratório do país, e compara 
o desempenho das empresas no Brasil e no Golfo do México Americano, segundo os 
investimentos realizados para aquisição dessas áreas. Apresenta, ainda, um modelo estocástico 
para estimava do valor dos blocos desenvolvido a partir das ofertas realizadas para áreas da Bacia 
de Campos em licitações pretéritas. Para analisar o nível de competição esperado para essas áreas, 
este estudo descreve também o desenvolvimento de um sistema especialista com a ferramenta 
Exsys Corvid®, baseado no julgamento de 36 especialistas da indústria do petróleo que trabalham 
em 20 companhias de pequeno, médio e grande porte. A aplicação desta metodologia permite que 
estas companhias estimem o nível de competição (alto, moderado, ou baixo) para áreas da Bacia 
de Campos. Conhecendo o valor das áreas e a estimativa do nível de competição, é possível 
subsidiar o processo decisório na elaboração de estratégias de oferta que permitam uma melhor 
alocação financeira dos recursos e a gestão ótima do portfólio exploratório pretendido pela 
companhia. 
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ABSTRACT 
RODRIGUEZ, Monica Rebelo, Análise de Competição em Licitações Brasileiras de Áreas de 
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo. Departamento de Engenharia de Petróleo: Faculdade de 
Engenharia Mecânica, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2010. 185 p. Tese de Doutorado. 
After 10 years of the ending of petroleum exploration and production (E&P) monopoly in Brazil, 
the market for those activities has shown to be stable and competitive, providing positive results 
which attracted both national and international investment for the upstream oil and gas sector. 
The regulatory agency promotes public licensing of E&P areas through a competitive sealed bid 
auction, whose rules are clear and known in advance by the companies. This research describes 
and evaluates the historical data for these E&P licensing, as well as for tenders of marginal 
oilfield accumulations, under the Brazilian economic scenario and the geologic potential of the 
country. It also compares oil companies performance regarding investment made in acquiring 
areas in Brazil to those in US-Gulf of Mexico. A stochastic model for block-value estimation is 
presented and applied to previous data from Campos Basin licensed areas. In order to estimate the 
level of competition expected for those areas, an expert system was built using Exsys Corvid®, 
based on the knowledge captured from 36 specialists in Brazilian public licensing working for 20 
oil companies. The proposed methodology is applied to the case of Campos Basin areas and 
showed to properly estimate the levels of competition expected (high, moderate or low) in the 
bid. By knowing the block-value and the expected level of competition, decision makers are 
better prepared for formulating bidding strategies that can result in better resources allocation and 
yield a better exploration portfolio management. 
 
Key Words 
Petroleum exploration and production, petroleum public licensing, competition, games, auction, 
risk and uncertainties, economic evaluation, expert system 
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1. INTRODUÇÃO 
1.1. Motivação 
Na indústria brasileira do petróleo, bem como em vários países do mundo em que o estado 
é o proprietário dos recursos minerais existentes no subsolo, a transfer6encia de direitos e 
obrigações para explorar e produzir petróleo se dá por meio de licitações públicas de áreas pré-
determinadas, e segundo regras pré-estabelecidas pela agência reguladora. 
As companhias de petróleo qualificadas para participar desses processos licitatórios 
competem entre si pela aquisição dessas áreas para compor / recompor seu portfólio exploratório 
ou explotatório. Portanto, para vencerem a competição entre si, essas companhias devem 
apresentar a oferta mais competitiva, cuja elaboração se baseia em dois aspectos críticos: a 
valoração técnico-econômica da área e a análise da competição esperada para a área de interesse.  
Cada companhia faz sua estimativa de valor da área e compromete uma fração deste valor 
como oferta na licitação. A estimativa desta fração ótima é dada por modelos matemáticos, 
amplamente divulgados na literatura, que visam determinar a oferta ótima capaz de maximizar os 
investimentos da companhia. Esses modelos adotam como premissa, dentre outras, que exista 
competição pela área. Entretanto, não são conhecidos na literatura modelos que permitam realizar 
esta análise de competição considerando a percepção dos decisores. Sabendo que a análise de 
competição é um fator que pode modificar consideravelmente a oferta que a companhia 
apresentará para uma área, esta pesquisa se dedicou ao desenvolvimento de ferramentas para o 
cálculo da oferta ótima e estimativa do nível de competição esperado nas licitações brasileiras.  
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1.2. Objetivos 
A presente pesquisa objetiva desenvolver um método de estimativa do nível de competição 
esperado em uma determinada licitação pública brasileira para áreas de exploração e produção de 
petróleo (E&P), localizadas em uma bacia sedimentar marítima com sistema petrolífero ativo.  
Sua contribuição para a indústria do petróleo, dentre outras, é auxiliar os decisores nos 
processos de elaboração de estratégias de oferta mais competitivas que maximizem os 
investimentos e/ou aumentem a chance das empresas adquirirem áreas de E&P. 
1.3. Estrutura do Trabalho 
 
Para se alcançar o objetivo pretendido, esse trabalho contou com uma extensa pesquisa 
bibliográfica sobre licitações brasileiras de áreas de exploração e produção de petróleo (E&P), 
sobre modelos e processos de licitação no mundo, e ouviu a opinião de especialistas com 
experiência em leilões no Brasil e no mundo. Todas as observações aqui apresentadas consideram 
os conceitos da teoria dos leilões, da teoria dos jogos e de como se desenha um modelo de 
licitação que atenda as necessidades do governo e da indústria. 
O desenvolvimento da pesquisa e seus resultados são apresentados na forma de artigos 
técnicos publicados em congressos e revistas nacionais e internacionais, compondo os capítulos 
subsequentes, exceto o capítulo 6, ainda não publicado, cujo texto será submetido à apreciação da 
revista Resources Policy. A organização desses artigos (capítulos) segue a sequência da pesquisa 
e não sua ordem cronológica de publicação, permitindo assim, se ter um entendimento da 
evolução do trabalho  
O capítulo 2 apresenta o artigo publicado na revista Terrae, v. 6. no.1, em 2009, e discorre 
sobre como a agência reguladora brasileira (ANP) formatou o processo de licitação de áreas de 
E&P após o fim do monopólio estatal exercido pela Petrobras. Inicialmente, é mostrado o cenário 
de preço do petróleo mundial, em queda a partir da década de 80, e os resultados de sucesso 
exploratório alcançados simultaneamente pela Petrobras com a descoberta de campos gigantes de 
óleo na Bacia de Campos, que motivaram empresas estrangeiras a participarem das licitações 
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instituídas quando da sanção da Lei 9478/97 pelo governo. A idéia central deste capítulo é 
mostrar que o modelo adotado pela ANP, em função dos resultados das licitações, é considerado 
sucesso dentro dos conceitos teóricos que analisam o número de participantes no processo 
(competidores), a quantidade de área adquirida e o montante de bônus arrecadado pelo governo. 
Após seis anos licitando com sucesso as áreas exploratórias, a ANP ofereceu ao mercado 
áreas inativas com acumulação marginais de petróleo sob um modelo muito semelhante ao já 
consagrado. O capítulo 3 apresenta as informações sobre este modelo e os resultados das duas 
licitações realizadas até então, mostrando que devido ao caráter de baixos volumes recuperáveis, 
o número e o perfil das companhias que competem por essas áreas difere daquelas que se 
qualificam para as licitações exploratórias. Em geral, são companhias brasileiras de pequeno 
porte que competem pelas áreas, preferencialmente consorciadas entre si, e que não têm perfil de 
atuação conhecido no segmento “upstream” da cadeia do petróleo. O objetivo dessa seção, cujo 
artigo foi publicado na Revista Brasileira de Geociências, v. 38, no. 2 em 2008, além de 
apresentar os dados compilados destas licitações, é mostrar que a análise de competição é um 
estudo a ser feito para qualquer processo decisório de aquisição de área via licitação pública. 
Entretanto, as áreas inativas com acumulações marginais não foram alvo deste estudo devido à 
ausência de um número de dados estatisticamente significativo para a aplicação dos métodos de 
valoração e competição aqui propostos. 
Assim sendo, tais métodos foram desenvolvidos para as licitações de áreas exploratórias da 
Bacia de Campos, por esta ter sido ofertada em oito das dez licitações promovidas pela ANP, 
existindo, portanto, uma massa crítica de dados que permitiram estudar os processos decisórios de 
aquisição de áreas. A tomada de decisão sobre qual a oferta mais competitiva a apresentar precisa 
considerar o valor ótimo da oferta a ser comprometida como bônus de assinatura, o montante de 
programa de trabalho exploratório (PEM) e o nível de competição esperado para cada área. O 
capítulo 4 mostra que a busca por métodos que maximizem as ofertas apresentadas pelas 
companhias é objeto de estudo de vários autores, conforme indicado na literatura deste artigo 
publicado na AAPG Bulletin, v. 92, no. 10 em 2008. Dentro dos conceitos de eficiência alocativa, 
maximização de receitas e multidimensionalidade das informações e das propostas foi 
desenvolvido um método, baseado na simulação estocástica utilizando o método de Monte Carlo, 
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para calcular a oferta ótima a partir das informações públicas (simétricas) existentes. Os 
resultados simulados são comparados aos bônus efetivamente realizados e a análise das 
estratégias adotadas pelas companhias, permite o decisor identificar como é possível elaborar 
uma estratégia de oferta competitiva utilizando diferentes valores da fração do valor monetário 
esperado (VME) da área. 
A partir deste ponto da pesquisa duas questões suscitaram interesse em se investigar: 
a) a primeira se refere aos valores de oferta que as companhias de petróleo estão oferecendo para 
as áreas da Bacia de Campos. Partindo da premissa da licitação competitiva selada, ou seja, que 
tais companhias não conhecem os valores que seus competidores irão oferecer pela área, nem 
quais são estas áreas de interesse, nem quantos e quais são estes competidores, foi testada a 
hipótese de que as empresas que participam de uma licitação brasileira realizam investimentos 
para aquisição de áreas similares aos realizados para áreas no Golfo do México Americano; 
b) a segunda diz respeito ao processo decisório em si que requer uma análise de competição 
robusta para que a oferta mais competitiva seja  vencedora, sem entretanto, deixar um montante 
de dinheiro desnecessário sobre a mesa ou que permita a companhia não ser vítima da maldição 
do vencedor (pagamento de bônus muito elevados que não retornarão os investimentos 
realizados). 
 O capítulo 5 aborda o teste de hipótese supracitado, tendo sido escolhido o Golfo do 
México Americano (US-GOM) por ter suas áreas licitadas, segundo um modelo com dinâmica de 
oferta semelhante às licitações brasileiras, por mais de 40 anos, apresentando áreas com 
resultados de sucesso exploratório, campos em produção com infraestrutura de escoamento, e 
características geológicas para acumulação de hidrocarboneto, similares as da Bacia de Campos 
(BC). A análise comparativa entre as ofertas do US-GOM e da BC considerou os valores de 
bônus e PEM e teve seus resultados publicados sob o no. SPE 113696 dos anais do 2008 SPE 
Europec / EAGE Annual Conf. and Exhibition. A análise foi conduzida para ofertas por áreas de 
águas rasas e profundas, onde se observou que as empresas internacionais adquirem as áreas da 
BC desembolsando valores “upfront” comparáveis aos bônus pagos por áreas no US-GOM, 
porém comprometendo valores adicionais a título de PEM como pagamento de longo termo.  
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 No capítulo 6 é apresentada a metodologia desenvolvida para auxiliar os decisores no 
processo de estimativa de competição que suporta a escolha da melhor estratégia de oferta. Esta 
seção, estruturada sob a forma de artigo técnico ainda não foi publicada, mas seu conteúdo foi 
submetido à apreciação do editor da revista Resources Policy. Com o intuito de identificar como 
os decisores estimam a competição, alguns métodos de pesquisa operacional baseados em análise 
mutliatributo foram investigados (matriz de decisão e processo analítico hierárquico) com o 
suporte acadêmico do Prof. Dr. Michael Walls na Economic and Business Division da Colorado 
School of Mines. Porém, tais métodos, apesar de lidar com a preferência dos decisores, não 
incorporam processos cognitivos como o julgamento de cada decisor (raciocínio lógico 
construído a partir de suas experiências e conhecimento). Métodos como sistema especialista, 
ramo da inteligência artificial, capturam tais julgamentos, sendo capaz de auxiliar as tomadas de 
decisão a partir da construção de uma base de conhecimento e da formulação de regras que 
representam a lógica racional dos decisores. A construção do sistema especialista se deu a partir 
da captura do conhecimento de 36 representantes da indústria do petróleo familiarizados com os 
processos de licitação no Brasil. Profissionais de empresas de pequeno, médio e grande porte 
foram convidados a responder um questionário inédito desenvolvido especificamente para 
abordar a competição por áreas da Bacia de Campos, o qual permitiu quantificar a percepção com 
relação a formação de parcerias e outros. Transformando este conhecimento em variáveis, regras 
e blocos lógicos com a plataforma Exsys Corvid®, foi possível estimar o nível de competição 
esperado para cenários variáveis do tipo de áreas ofertadas, do número e perfil de companhias 
participantes e quanto ao tipo e proveniência das informações que circulam durante o período de 
licitação e que podem impactar a análise de competição. 
 Toda a metodologia desenvolvida nesse trabalho se voltou para as licitações brasileiras de 
áreas de exploração e produção sob o modelo de concessão adotado pela ANP. Entretanto, 
motivada pelo novo marco regulatório que determina a assunção do modelo de Partilha de 
Produção (PSC) para licitar áreas exploratórias da camada do pré-sal, esta pesquisa capturou o 
julgamento dos especialistas quanto ao possível impacto que este modelo e suas regras poderiam 
causar na competição por estas áreas. Os resultados são apresentados e discutidos ainda no 
capítulo 6. 
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 Por fim, o capítulo 7 resume as principais conclusões desta pesquisa e elenca algumas 
sugestões para trabalhos futuros. 
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Abstract 
This article proposes a method to estimate the competition level in future Brazilian petroleum 
leases, built upon Campos Basin history data. The method can be applied to all competitive 
licensing structures, independently of the type of exploration agreement used (concession or 
production sharing contracts). The level of competition in both agreement models is broadly the 
same, but there are some intrinsic differences, widely reviewed by the literature, that could lead to 
changes in the licensing results. The estimation of the competition level is directly related to the 
definition of the winning offer. In Brazilian licensing procedures the winner bid results from a 
combination of three attributes: (1) signature bonus value; (2) minimum exploration program; and 
(3) local content level. This combination makes the estimation of competition level a key issue for 
decision-makers to strategically define the most competitive offer that could enhance the 
possibility to win the area. The proposed methodology is based on the capture of knowledge 
expert's to build a knowledge automation expert system, using EXSYS CORVID® software, that 
could help decision-makers while estimating competition for a petroleum acreage licensing sale on 
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Campos Basin - the most successful exploration and production (E&P) pool for the last 30 years in 
Brazil. The method collected the judgment of 36 professionals occupying different hierarchy 
levels, working for 20 companies performing E&P activities offshore Brazil, such as super-majors, 
majors and independent petroleum companies. The results brought to light by this study allow 
companies to use a reliable method to objectively estimate competition level for Brazilian 
petroleum lease sale, helping decision-makers to develop bidding strategies aligned with 
companies’ exploration portfolio long term strategies. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This article proposes a method to estimate competition level for future Brazilian petroleum 
leases, built upon Campos Basin history data. 
 
The method can be applied to all competitive licensing structures, independently of the type of 
exploration agreement used (concession or production sharing contracts), but varying the premises 
adopted. The level of competition in both agreement models is broadly the same, but there are 
some intrinsic differences, widely reviewed by the literature, that could lead to changes in the 
licensing results. 
 
The estimation of the competition level is directly related to the definition of the winning offer. 
According to Capen et al. (1971) and Lohrenz (1987), the optimal bid estimation is based on the 
highest signature bonus value. However, for the Brazilian licensing procedures, the winner bid 
results from a combination of three attributes: (1) signature bonus value; (2) minimum exploration 
program; and (3) local content level. This combination makes the estimation of competition level a 
key issue for decision-makers to strategically define the most competitive offer that could enhance 
the possibility to win the area. 
 
Achieving more with less requires formulating and deploying sound strategies. Today’s 
Exploration and Production (E&P) Licensing competition demands excellence both in strategy and 
in its execution by senior management to win the bid. One of the most important process for a 
petroleum company when planning to participate in an E&P Licensing  acreage is estimate the 
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level of competition it should face. As part of a whole decision making process that has long-term 
implications and short time to decide, top managers should consider not only the well known 
mathematical techniques, but human perceptions and judgments involved to reach high risk 
decisions. The focus should be on developing a comprehensive methodology for solving strategic 
level decision making problem which are at present tackled in an ad-hoc manner.  
 
The proposed methodology consist in capturing competitor’s knowledge to build a 
mathematical model based on expert system, which should help decision-maker estimate the level 
of competition in a licensing sale. The method for capturing expert’s knowledge uses both 
interviews and questionnaires, was developed specifically for this purpose. These tools took into 
consideration aspects raised from the literature that are identified as fundamental on the estimation 
of competition level. Having captured these expertise and using a computer program - EXSYS 
CORVID®, based on an expert system, which is a branch of artificial intelligence, it was possible 
to develop a knowledge automated expert system using the questionnaires´ answers to build the 
rule-based logic and blocks logic in order to bring the best recommendation, instead of either a 
guess or a trivial solution.  
 
The questionnaire, used to investigate the main competition variables, adopted a hypothetical 
scenario considering a Brazilian licensing sale for petroleum acreage located at Campos Basin, a 
mature offshore sedimentary basin because it has been: (1) offered in eight out of ten licensing 
sales held in the country, providing a significant amount of unbiased data on bid results; (2) the 
offshore basin with higher number of competitors bidding for areas; and (3) a successful 
exploration pool for the last 30 years, presently accounting for around 85% of the total Brazilian 
petroleum production, which positively impacts the evaluation companies  have about the areas 
offered in each lease sale.  
 
The method applied to estimate competition level for Campos Basin areas in Brazilian leases 
takes into account: (1) the judgment of 36 staff individuals of super-majors, majors and 
independent petroleum companies, positioned at different hierarchy levels; (2) the petroleum 
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potential areas in each lease round; (3) E&P corporate strategies, structure and size of the licensing 
qualified companies; and (4) the overall scenario of worldwide E&P activities. 
 
The results brought to light by this study allow companies to use a reliable method to 
objectively estimate competition level for Brazilian petroleum lease sale, helping decision-makers 
to develop bidding strategies aligned with companies’ exploration portfolio long term strategies. 
 
This article is organized in four sections. The first section explains the role of competition in a 
licensing sale, followed by another chapter dedicated to present the methodology developed to help 
decision making estimates the expected level of competition. The third section points out the 
results obtained with the expert’s knowledge captured, which is the base of all research on 
competition. A set of conclusions wraps up the research project performed and the results 
achieved. 
 
2. The Role of Competition in Petroleum Licensing Environment 
 
Auctioning petroleum rights is a game where players take strategic decisions considering 
other players´ behavior, turning competition evaluation into a focal point for bidding strategies. 
The game theory literature contains a number of papers about optimal common value auctions that 
maximize revenues, as well as the importance of the game rules and characteristics of the 
economic environment for equilibrium models. It also assumes that bidder’s private information is 
symmetrically distributed or bidders have no uncertainty over what the auctioned asset is worth to 
them (Porter, 1995).  
    
According to Cramtom (2005), offering exploration acreage through auction is advantageous 
due to the tendency this process has to transfer rights and obligations to the most capable 
companies to explore them. This can be reached through the existing competition among players. 
Oil companies estimating higher value for a specific area can make a better offer enhancing their 
chance to win the willing acreage  
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Another advantage of competition in sealed bid auctions is to grant the success of the 
licensing process. As stated by Cramtom (op.cit.), highly competitive bids always grant 
government higher financial return drift resulting from the success of a sealed bid auction. 
Whenever there are more players bidding in the auction game, more amounts of cash signature 
bonuses are committed as a result of companies' geological evaluation of available areas. These 
bonuses reveal the companies' value for the area, suggesting that competitors are aware of 
companies' perception which may result in higher offer values in the upcoming auctions. As the 
level of competition increases, more aggressive optimal bids are offered, leading to the conclusion 
that the best competitive bid could be a good predictor of an asset’s value (Rothkopf & Harstad, 
1994) 
 
Depending on the number of players (competitors), companies risk aversion, technical 
expertise and the economic criteria of each company, the offer presented for each exploration area 
reflects a fraction of a market value for each company evaluation, and may vary significantly. 
 
Competition is a parameter used by Reece (1979) to evaluate which kind of licensing model 
grants a higher rent of return to the government. He developed a mathematical model using the 
number of competitors as a variable that represents competition. The assumptions adopted 
considered that companies are not acting in a “cartelized” manner they focus the maximum rate of 
return, make independent offers, and know the associated costs of the area they are bidding for. 
Reece (op.cit.) also assumes identical bidding strategies for all companies. 
 
After analyzing the revenues captured by the government in models based on signature 
bonus, profit share and royalty taxes, Reece (op.cit.) concluded that the higher slice of total rent is 
obtained when adopting a Production Sharing Contract model and the lowest return is obtained 
with a Signature Bonus model for any number of competitors playing the game. In a Signature 
bonus model, from competitors’ side, Capen et al. (1971) suggest that they should present lower 
offers whenever there are a higher number of players in a particular petroleum auction to avoid the 
winner’s curse. According to their analyses a higher number of players implies in more acreage 
acquired, but with low value spent per area. As the number of players increases, competitors tend 
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to enhance their offers paying higher values than the worth one, consequently letting money on the 
table. Another negative aspect of committing a higher bonus bid is the possibility of winner’s 
curse. According to its technical and economic evaluation one company overestimates forecasted 
reserves bidding a higher bonus value for this acreage. E&P activities show results below the 
expected bidding profitability, i.e., the volumes are lower than forecasted causing a lower internal 
rate of return. This phenomenon is known as winner’s curse (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Schematic diagram from acreage evaluation up to obtain a proved reserve bearing a 
winner’s curse 
 
Johnston (1994) states that for a bidder having success on the auction and still have some 
profits with the activities developed over the winner area it should bid below the expected 
monetary value (EMV). The bonus (b) corresponds to a fraction (c) of the EMV (equation 1). This 
“c” value (bid fraction) should be comprised between 0 and 1 for EMV values ranging from 0 to 
100%.  Capen et alii (1971) assume “c” as representative of a fraction of the market reserve value 
that should vary from 20% to 30% (c=0.2 up to 0.3) due to the area attractiveness, available 
information and reserve uncertainties to avoid a winner’s curse. 
b = c x EMV                                                      (Equation 1) 
The increased competition produces increased allowance for a winner’s curse. According to 
Rothkopf & Harstad (1994), the winning bidders expect profit to decline approximately as the 
square of the number of bidders and decreases when estimating accuracy increases.  
 
Hartsock (1977) developes a mathematical model to help companies with bidding strategies 
based on their behavior on US-GOM tenders. He was looking for answers to questions like: Should 
a bid combine spend companies leasing budget by bidding very high on a few low-risk area, thus 
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enhancing their chances of winning some area, or should they distribute the budget over more areas 
by bidding less on each area while reducing the chances of winning any single area? And, is it 
more beneficial for a company to bid with a group, thereby spreading the risk by reducing the 
expected cost, or should a company bid alone assuming the full risk?   
Hoffman et al. (1991) analyze auction games in which companies developed partnership 
(consortium) to present only one offer, apparently to share risk capital and information. They use 
direct correlations of an auction measurement and concluded that competition is positively 
correlated with market variables. Besides this, they observe that variables such as "number of 
competitors" and "number of offers" should be considered independently one from another when 
analyzing auction results in order not to mask the game comprehension. 
 
Literature widely states that companies pool to split technical risk and commit more cash 
value for the offer (Iledare et al., 2004; Saidi & Marsden, 1992). Hoffman et al. (1991) observe a 
positive correlation between the number of players (company presenting offer in a licensing sale) 
and the number of consortium attesting that making a joint bidding offer not necessarily reduces 
the total number of players presenting offer. Repsold (2003) points out that consortium have a 
tendency to unify the proposals toward the higher one, and to, along time, disclose companies 
techniques and strategies, allowing an important knowledge on competitors behavior. Conversely, 
Rothkopf & Harstad (1994) conclude that firms have concern about revealing information to rivals 
that will create disadvantages during the current auction and they may go to great effort to withhold 
private information which is a key to future bidding profitability.  
 
Saidi & Marsden (op.cit.) identify that consortia formed through the association of two, 
three, or even four companies presenting one offer for a specific area, tend to be the winner against 
offers made by sole companies. Consortium could associate companies with different profiles and 
financial support, allowing more competitive offers that could result in the area acquisition with a 
lower capital exposition for each company. In this sense, consortium can be considered more 
aggressive enhancing the likelihood to win their higher priority acreage or buying higher number of 
low priority areas with considerable money left on the table. 
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Emphasizing that companies participating in a petroleum exploration licensing are: a) serious 
and competent for doing E&P activities; b) legal, technical and financially qualified for the 
licensing; and c) have a firm intention to present offers and acquire acreage aligned with their 
strategies; divergence of opinions among competitors could result from reasons such as the 
existence of information. 
 
Porter (1995) discuss the role of information in the Outer Continental Shelf lease sales, and 
posted that it can play a crucial role in auctions, as information level varies among competitors. 
Part of the information is available for all players, but others are restricted to few companies. The 
available information is called public, and is generally sold by the regulatory agency for the players 
interested in making an offer which shall pay for the geological data. The restricted or private 
information one is known only by the companies performing E&P activities around the area 
offered in the licensing. In this sense it is right to state that public information generates symmetry 
among competitors while private one, creates an asymmetry which is favorable for the well 
informed company (Tavares, 2000). 
 
Reece (1979) observes that in licensing where players have the same level of information, i. 
e., only symmetric information, companies tend to obtain similar values for the auctioned area, and 
government revenue fractions are higher than the competitors, independent of the licensing model 
applied. For Sunnevåg (2000), to estimate competition through the number of competitors is 
irrelevant when only public information is available. In petroleum licensing with asymmetric 
information, companies´ evaluation may vary significantly, resulting in different values for the 
asset auctioned. The strategic variable, in this case, is the number of companies possessing private 
data. Therefore, any asymmetric information is a competitive advantage for one company over the 
others, enhancing its possibility to make profits. 
 
It is reasonable to consider that information has a fundamental role in reducing uncertainties 
on acreage technical and economic evaluation. Companies with more data and knowledge can 
make more precise evaluation of the hydrocarbon potential of an area, and decision-makers feel 
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more confident in ranking the areas they will bid for, and how much should be committed as 
signature bonus for each one. 
 
Although all the authors above mentioned agree that the three more important variables to 
analyze competition in a licensing round are: a) the area auctioned, b) the qualified companies, and 
c) the available information; in general, they developed their mathematical models for bidding 
optimization. Academics are interested in a methodology that could give a better offer estimation 
to win the bid paying as less as possible to not left money on the table. Competition is mainly 
evaluated from a revenue return point of view.  
 
The purpose of this study is, using these three main variables, estimate the expected level of 
competition in a Brazilian licensing sale. 
 
3. Research Methods and Methodology to Estimate Competition Level 
 
The main purpose of this study is to estimate the expected level of competition in a particular 
petroleum exploration licensing sale, based on the capture of experts knowledge which are directly 
involved in the decision making process. These experts are the ones who define the most 
competitive offer that could result in winning the bid for the specific acreage.  
 
Despite the fact that professionals of the oil industry usually do not document the way they 
estimate competition in the specialized literature, all companies participating in an E&P 
competitive bid perform competitive analyses. Artificial intelligence and Operational Research 
methods (OR) can be pointed out as the most common methods applied. 
 
Different from the standard optimization techniques, which are appropriate to solve problems 
for predictable environments, deterministic behavior of people, or for small and narrow contents - 
the multi-criteria decision making process have been studied under the general classification of OR 
problems. Its purpose is to deal with taking decisions in the presence of a number of often 
conflicting criteria, and is divided into two groups: multi-objective and multi-attribute decision 
making (Bhushan & Rai, 2004). As multi-attribute deals with discrete decision spaces, where 
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decision alternatives are predetermined, two analytical methods were tested to estimate the level of 
competition: 1) the weighted sum method (WSM), and 2) the analytical hierarchy process (AHP). 
WSM is a decision matrix approach used to evaluate each alternative with respect to each criterion 
and then multiplies that evaluation by the importance of the criterion. AHP is a structured 
technique for dealing with complex decisions. Rather than prescribing a "correct" decision, AHP 
helps decision-makers find the one that best suits their needs and their understanding of the 
problem (Saaty, 2008). Despite that these methods catch some characteristics of the decision 
making process, both AHP and WSM do not reach reliable results, but allow a better understanding 
of the decision making process and the variables involved. They do not capture the decision-maker 
judgment, which is a fundamental element when analyzing competition. Some of those methods 
deal with preferences that differ from judgment, a cognitive aspect of the decision making process 
(Bazerman, 2006). 
 
As artificial Intelligence encompasses many aspects of human behavior such as speech, 
language, movement, among others, knowledge automation expert systems - a branch of Artificial 
Intelligence, which focuses on the capture and dissemination of problem solving knowledge via 
computer programs – tends to be a powerful tool for estimation of the level of competition. These 
expert systems are used to advise, diagnose, or troubleshoot problems that were once only 
performed by humans. This option will be used by this research project. 
 
The method adopted by this research to collect data can be divided into two groups: 
quantitative or qualitative research, and deskwork or fieldwork. Among the existing research 
approaches, surveys were adopted to collect data by asking pre-established questions in a specific 
order to a group of individuals who are representative of a targeted population. This research 
project applies two types of survey: questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. 
 
• Questionnaires, as observed by Blaxter et al. (1996, in: Asrilhant, 2001), are one of the most 
commonly used research techniques in the social sciences. They are mainly used for collecting 
primary data, whether they are quantitative or qualitative. Questionnaires are usually posted, 
but they can also be administered by telephone, e-mail or face-to-face. Questionnaires must 
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involve properly framed questions, so that the respondents can clearly and unequivocally 
understand them. A researcher must also test and amend a questionnaire before its 
administration. There are two formats of questions: closed and open-ended. A type of closed 
question is the forced-choice question. This allows the respondents to select one or more 
responses from an exhaustive and mutually exclusive list of alternatives. The other type of 
closed question uses a response options format. Finally, open-ended questions allow for free 
answers; 
• Interviews, another research technique, represent an extensively applied method of 
investigating the participants’ experiences, perspectives and understandings in some depth. 
Interviews are categorized into different formats, such as structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured. A structured interview is a formal instrument based on an interview schedule. It 
comprehends a set of clear instructions, and questions are asked in a specific order. The semi-
structured interview is less formal, including open-ended questions. Questions are not posed in 
a rigid order, and can be re-worded for a specific interview. Unstructured interviews do no 
impose clear rules. They are based on an interview agenda where open-ended questions are 
developed during the interviews (Clarke and Dawson, 1999a, in: Asrilhant, 2001). 
The proposed research methodology is divided into three phases: 1) the exploratory 
investigation, (2) the knowledge capture, and (3) the expert system development. The methodology 
began with a qualitative approach. A set of semi-structured, preliminary face-to-face interviews 
were carried out to give a sense of reality to the research problem, motivate the design of the next 
steps of the proposed research methodology and support the reviewed literature to describe the 
research hypotheses. The exploratory investigation was followed by a quantitative approach. A 
questionnaire, which was the main source of data in the current study, tested the research 
hypothesis, generalized the exploratory findings, consolidated the overall findings, and supported 
the development of the logic base rules to build the expert system model. Finally, a computer work 
was performed based on the principles of artificial intelligence incorporating the expert knowledge 
captured by the questionnaire to help decision-makers estimate the level of competition. In this 
research project, the presence of the interviewee during the questionnaire application was 
fundamental to explore relevant issues that could give more details regarding the issues 
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investigated by the questionnaire. Table 1 summarizes the phases of the proposed research 
methodology. 
 
3.1 Exploratory Investigation 
 
The exploratory investigation consisted of the pilot testing of the questionnaire. It was set as 
a transition from theory to method which relates and checks theory with practice, as a prototype of 
the core investigation, and motivated the design of the next phases of the current research 
methodology. The exploratory investigation was performed in two stages: (1) exploratory 
deskwork, and (2) exploratory fieldwork (Table 2). The exploratory deskwork aimed to seek a 
correspondence between the elements obtained from theory and practice, defining the set of main 
elements to be placed within a conceptual framework. The exploratory fieldwork is the part of the 
research dedicated to obtain from experts their consent on the deskwork mapped variables. The 
definition of fieldwork should consider the current fast technological evolution aggregating such a 
kind of work done virtually, such as telephone interviews and e-mailed questionnaires. 
 
TABLE 1 - Research Methodology Phases 
Phase 
 
Number  Denomination 
Research Techniques Objectives Period  
I Exploratory 
Investigation 
Semi-structured 
preliminary interviews 
To define the relevant elements 
in practice and theory to design 
a questionnaire for competition 
level estimation 
February to  
September, 2009 
II Knowledge 
Capture 
Semi-structured face-to-
face and emailed 
questionnaire 
To identify the logic reasoning 
behind experts´ judgments on 
competition level 
November, 2009 to 
February, 2010 
III Building an 
Expert System 
Computer program based 
on artificial intelligence 
that uses blocks logic and 
rule-based logic 
To build an automated system 
that represents experts´ 
thoughts on competition to help 
the decision making process. 
January to June, 2010 
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TABLE 2 – Exploratory Investigation Stages 
Stage 
Number Denomination 
Research Techniques Objectives Period 
I Exploratory 
Deskwork 
Theory Analysis Definition of a set of relevant 
elements both corresponding in 
theory and practice 
August, 2008 to 
January, 2009 
II Exploratory 
Fieldwork 
Face-to-face and virtual 
interviews. Semi-structured 
questionnaire prototype 
To collect experts perception on 
the variables and the level of 
competition  
February, 2009 to 
June, 2010 
 
 
Exploratory Deskwork 
 
The exploratory deskwork target was to search for the identification of a set of relevant 
elements from the literature and seek a correspondence between theory and practice. The elements 
should be supported by the literature to ensure their completeness and credibility in order to be 
effective and acceptable. Elements must be carefully examined in order to assess the extent to 
which they are included, and whether any element should be combined, eliminated or re-stated, 
along with the examination of potential interrelationships amongst them.  
 
Widely discussed by the theory presented in Section 2, the elements identified were grouped 
in four main sets. The first one is related to the importance of the geological and economic 
potential of the area been offered in a particular tender (prospectivity, proximity to existing 
production facilities, among others). The second set refers to possible competitors (number of 
qualified companies, strategies, past tender behavior, E&P activities in the basin, among others). 
The third group focuses on information (symmetric or asymmetric, amount and quality, confidence 
on information source). The last category holds joint bidding arrangements envisaging area 
acquisition. 
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These necessary and sufficient sets of relevant elements for the estimation of competition 
level in decision making process are the basis for the exploratory fieldwork, which follows. 
 
Exploratory Fieldwork  
 
The main purpose of the exploratory fieldwork is to check and calibrate the elements 
identified for estimating the level of competition in E&P licensing acreage. Interviewing experts, 
whose knowledge rose from the business world of upstream oil and gas sector, helped achieve this 
purpose. 
 
The exploratory fieldwork was conducted interviewing eight professionals of the upstream 
oil and gas industry. It was carried out doing seven semi-structured face-to-face interviews and one 
e-mailed questionnaire for group of decision-makers holding top, medium and junior positions 
(two executive directors, two senior advisors, two business consultants, and two technicians). Each 
interview lasted, on average, one hour. The relevant elements and their operational definitions were 
produced, based on the ranking of the most important elements, such as: (1) the geological 
potential of auctioned asset, (2) the total number of companies qualified and their E&P profile; and 
(3) the available information on companies´ E&P strategies. During the questionnaire testing a 
second round of contact was conducted by e-mailing the questionnaire to four professionals, 
among the eight previously interviewed. This second approach supported the re-examination of the 
proposed set of elements and the possible interrelationships amongst them, helping the design of 
the final version of the questionnaire.  
 
3.2 Knowledge Capture 
 
 
This is the core investigation methodology on this research and consisted of design and 
administration of a questionnaire. 
 
According to Awad (2003), knowledge is human understanding of a specialized field of 
interest that has been acquired through experience and study. Davenport and Prusak (2000) define 
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knowledge as a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight 
that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. 
Hence, a knowledge base is a set of facts and inference rules for determining new information and 
“smarter” knowledge to support decision making. It is not a simply database. It is an understanding 
gained through study that includes perception, skills, training, common sense, and experience.  
 
Intelligent behavior implies the ability to understand and use language and store and access 
relevant experience. Humans acquire expertise, learnt via experience. Expertise incorporates the 
ability to reason and make deductions as well as common sense (unreflective opinions of ordinary 
human beings). Knowledge is neither data nor information. Although it is related to both, it 
embraces a wider sphere than information. Data are unorganized and unprocessed facts. 
Information has meaning, purpose and relevance. Therefore, evaluated data becomes information 
when meaning or value is added to improve the quality of decision making.  
 
A questionnaire is the main tool to capture expert’s knowledge in the domain of competition 
for petroleum acreage acquisition. It must be able to address the research question, test the research 
hypothesis, and catch respondents´ know-how to support the building of an expert system for 
expected level of competition estimation helping decision-makers elaborate the strategies to 
enhance their companies chances to win the bid. The questionnaire aimed to identify: (1) the 
elements to which decision-makers pay considerable attention while estimating competition level; 
(2) the inter-relationship among these elements; (3) the level of expected competition; and (4) 
decision-makers opinion about competition level and the licensing model applied by government. 
 
The knowledge capture comprised three stages. The first stage was the questionnaire design, 
which consisted of four steps: (1) sampling procedure; (2) questionnaire structure; (3) 
measurement and operational definition of the research variables; and (4) questionnaire reliability 
and validity. The second stage referred to the questionnaire administration, which consisted of 
three steps: (1) primary access; (2) pilot testing; and (3) main survey.  
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Questionnaire Design 
 
It describes the sampling procedure, as observed by Chou (1998), refers to the selection of a 
subject from a population of interest. The sampling procedure is divided into four areas of 
consideration: (1) unit of analysis; (2) sample size; (3) sample frame; and (4) sample design, as 
discussed in the following. This research project aims to estimate the level of competition to be 
used in a decision making process to define the most competitive offer for a specific area in a 
petroleum exploration lease. Sample size is an important step in the sampling procedure. The 
assumption of normality is, according to Hair et al. (1997), an influential constraint in dealing with 
basic statistics. The characteristics of the distribution (e.g. mean and standard deviation) and t- and 
F-tests are generally based on the premise of a normal distribution. According to the Central Limit 
Theorem, a sample size of at least thirty observations is necessary to take normality for granted. 
Samples with less than thirty observations are considered small and require special tests to 
determine statistically significant findings. 
 
This project research has a sample size of thirty-six valid observations. The sample frame 
refers to the identification and description of the targeted population. The focal population of this 
study is the Brazilian upstream oil and gas sector. The selection of the representative companies of 
the population was based on two complementary criteria: (1) concessionaires of E&P offshore 
areas; and (2) corporate structure and size. The concessionaire criteria was based on the number of 
current companies technically qualified by the petroleum regulatory agency to explore and produce 
oil and gas offshore Brazil. Consulting the petroleum regulatory agency data base (ANP, 2010) the 
number of current 77 concessionaires could be split into 46 companies performing onshore 
activities and, 31 operators or partners for E&P shallow or deepwater areas. A total number of 20 
offshore concessionaires was sampled corresponding to 65% of the total oil and gas companies 
currently working offshore Brazil. The second criterion was used to pick up those 20 
concessionaires according to their corporate structure and size. Six groups were formed to be 
representative of the diversity profile of companies and Public or Government Agencies operating 
in the Brazilian petroleum upstream sector: Super Majors, American Independents, International 
Oil Companies, Domestic Companies, and International Regional Companies. 
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As it occurs in most of the companies, the decision making process is generally done by 
more than one expert directly involved in the competition evaluation, it is important to sample as 
much experts as possible to obtain different judgments on competition. On the other hand, as 
petroleum licensing is a competitive process and any piece of information is considered to be a 
competitive advantage, experts must be confident on an interviewee’s ethical behavior. This 
research surveyed 36 experts, which were assured confidentiality by not disclosing their particular 
and professional identities, opinions and name of companies surveyed. Only the findings of this 
study are to be published as a whole. 
 
The main purpose of the questionnaire applied in this study is to capture how experts 
estimate competition level on a Concession Contract Licensing model. Considering that there were 
no existing questionnaires available for this purpose, the current questionnaire was an useful 
exploratory, descriptive instrument. The structure of the ten-page questionnaire consists of: a) 
cover letter, including a guidance for completing the questionnaire and a hypothetical petroleum 
exploration licensing round scenario; b) three sections of closed questions, and c) a fourth section 
comprised of one open-ended question. The guidance for completing the questionnaire included 
the aims of the research, fixed values and numbers of some discretionary variables in order to 
restrict the universe of dependent variables and some variables' definitions. When presenting the 
questionnaire face-to-face, the interviewee usually stated that they only need to answer questions 
which were relevant to them, and, if they had not been involved in any petroleum competitive 
bidding process they could either introduce the interviewee to another expert or forward the 
questionnaire to someone who had been involved with this subject. 
 
The questionnaire is structured in three main sections related to the three most important 
issues to be evaluated in competition level estimation: a) information; b) acreage; and c) 
companies’ profile. The first section of the questionnaire referred to the companies qualified for 
the licensing bid sale. The idea of this part is to capture expert judgment about the identification of 
potential competitors they could face according to their financial position and strategies for that 
specific licensing sale. The second section referred to the areas on offer by the regulatory agency in 
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the specified mature sedimentary basin. The purpose of the third section was to assess how 
information affects the competition level evaluation. These three sections also contain questions 
that mix the subjects, i.e., questions involving potential area with information, and/or number of 
potential competitors. The rationale behind these questions was to investigate the inter-
relationships of those variables and how they may change expert's perception on the competition 
level. The fourth section, composed by just one open-ended question, envisaged to capture the 
industry perception on how the new regulatory policies could impact the level of competition in the 
new Brazilian licensing model such as the Production Sharing Contract, under government 
analysis. Finally, respondents were advised that the research findings will be published after 
analyzed, and respondents will be notified about the publication.   
 
A total number of 25 multiple-choice questions plus some related questions were considered 
in the questionnaire. The multiple-choice type questions are either excludent (yes or no questions) 
or ranking scale questions. According to DeVellis (1991, in: Asrilhant, 2001), there are several 
formats for the scale items, such as the binary and the semantic differential, which are applied in 
this study and briefly discussed here. The binary scale involves a “yes-no” format, and the semantic 
differential scales adopt a five response options.  
 
Besides obtaining relevant information, another main goal of a questionnaire design is to 
collect this information with maximum reliability and validity (Warwick and Linninger, 1975 in: 
Key, 1997), because in scientific research accuracy is of great importance. Generally, scientific 
researches measure physical attributes, to which precise values can be assigned. As this study deals 
with experts’ knowledge it is essential to remind that values assigned to mental attributes can never 
be completely precise. The related imprecision is often looked upon as being too small to be of a 
practical concern. However, the magnitude of imprecision is much greater in the measurement of 
mental attributes than in that of physical attributes. This fact turns very the determination of the 
reliability of a measuring instrument (Willmott and Nuttall, 1975 in: Key, 1997).   
• Reliability is the tendency toward consistency found in repeated measurements, as defined by 
Carmines and Zeller (1979). A reliable research instrument is the one that yields the same 
results on repeated trials. Although unreliability is always present to a certain extent, 
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consistency could be reached with the results of a quality instrument gathered at different 
times. There are three main methods for measuring the reliability of an instrument: retest, 
alternative, and internal consistent (Key, 1997). Although pilot testing increase the consistency 
of the questionnaire, two administrations of the same instrument for a small group was 
performed to compare their past and present responses allowing the measurement of a 
reliability coefficient. The retest method was applied to 20% of the previous participants, and 
the average index of reliability reached 77%, proving the questionnaire design to be reliabie; 
• Validity is the extent to which a measuring instrument measures what is supposed to measure 
and can be checked through three basic approaches: content, criterion-related and construct 
validity (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). The content validity measures the degree to which the test 
items represent the domain of the trait been measured. It is strongly suggested to use a panel of 
experts in the field to be studied to identify a content area (Key, 1997). Interviews during the 
exploratory fieldwork and the pilot testing of the questionnaire done with some experts 
contributed to checking the questionnaire’s content validity. The current questionnaire is 
believed to have sound content validity. 
The total amount of 36 questionnaires was responded by qualified experts and is reliable and 
valid for the purpose of this research project. 
 
Questionnaire Administration 
 
It is appropriated to state that obtaining a significant number of potential respondents who 
would be willing to answer the questionnaire was a critical issue in this research. As the first 
author of this paper is an expert involved for more than ten years analyzing competition and 
partnerships developed in Brazilian E&P acreage sales it was straightforward to establish a list of 
contact and invite qualified professionals in a wide range of companies to participate in this 
research. Some experts that are doing similar business all over the world were also contacted and 
freely accepted to contribute in both pilot test and questionnaire administration phases. 
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        The methods or tools chosen for knowledge capture is not a straightforward routine, and 
depend on the nature, personality and attitude of the expert and whether the expert system will be 
built around a single or multiple experts, both have advantages and limitations. In spite of a single 
or multiple expert interviews the knowledge developer should be aware of different levels of 
expertise that influence communication quality. Higher level experts generally give concise 
explanations, but often skipping vital details. Moderate level experts tend to provide detailed 
explanations, being quick to give answers. Conversely, new experts tend to offer brief, fragmented 
answers, suggesting shallow knowledge. One possibility to improve knowledge capture by the 
developer is eliciting an expert’s knowledge through concrete case situations or scenarios.  
 
In this study the choice was to capture knowledge by applying a face-to-face questionnaire 
for multiple experts with different levels of knowledge, working for a wide range of petroleum 
companies, such as international oil companies, majors, and government agencies, among others.  
 
The tactic adopted was to contact experts that have already done business together in, at 
least, one of the ten previous Brazilian E&P Licensing Sales. Nineteen individuals invited by 
phone calls freely accepted to contribute with this research project. Eight were also selected to 
participate in the pilot testing of the questionnaire. These experts work for different oil companies 
and hold diverse positions on the hierarchy. Acting respect and trustfully with the research project, 
they recommended other experts working inside their companies or even working for other oil 
companies and/or petroleum institutions. A total number of 36 experts responded the 
questionnaire, and five refused to participate in the research, despite their awareness of the identity 
privacy and disclosing information policy of the project. The knowledge developer built a 
hypothetic scenario, presented in the questionnaire which was, even for the different companies, 
subject to the same boundary conditions in order to narrow the possibility of widening answers.  
 
The adopted scenario considered a fixed oil price, knowing licensing date and period, and 
determined number and profile of qualified companies that could potentially bid for areas in a 
petroleum mature sedimentary basin, such as Campos Basin. Data like oil price, fiscal system, 
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among others were set fixed to avoid considering economic and political risks that could imply in 
spread responses out. 
 
The thirty-six questionnaires were grouped according to companies´ corporate structure 
(Figure 2), meaning that, out of the twenty companies surveyed, 10% of the total number of 
questionnaires was responded by Super Majors workers, 15% from American Independents, 15% 
from Public or Government Agencies, 15% from International Regional Companies, 20% from 
Brazilian Companies and 25% from International Oil Companies. 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of the 20 petroleum companies and government entities surveyed. 
 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of respondents within the 20 petroleum companies and 
agencies. Three out of five pieces of the graphic show a percentage around 20% consultants, 
technicians and directors collaborating in this project. The smaller fraction corresponds to the 
amount of CEOs listened (11%) and the greatest proportion is represented by the managers sample 
(29%).  
 
Listening to a wide range of view points allows the knowledge developer to consider 
alternative ways of representing knowledge. An additional advantage was that scheduling a formal 
meeting frequently creates a better environment for generating thoughtful contributions. However, 
the greater the number of participants involved, the harder to retain confidentiality and get a 
consensus opinion, which could jeopardize the success of the survey. The method used to approach 
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experts was based on individuals formal meetings, believing that it could guarantee enough privacy 
to experts freely share information and answer the questionnaire, besides building up a trustful lie 
between expert and knowledge developer based on ethical behavior. The option to present the 
same questionnaire for all interviewees aims to avoid noise and uncertainties on the information 
captured granting a better translation of experts’ judgment into logic rules. Another benefit of a 
structured interview is to eliminate experts’ bias getting the same understanding through a 
standardized questionnaire, which ensures its validity and comparability. 
 
Individuals are imperfect information processors tending to form a preference for one 
outcome justifying this preference on a fair basis. This introduces to the decision making process a 
bias according to their self-interest. What should be an impartial judgment than become an 
unconscious and powerful systematic bias leading the decision making process to fail (Bazerman, 
2006). Understanding and limiting this bias in judgment could break some decision making 
patterns avoiding mistakes when taking decisions. 
 
Figure 3 – Distribution per group of the 36 specialists on Brazilian petroleum licensing 
participating on the research. 
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3.3 Building an Expert System 
 
This step of the methodology is a confirmatory investigation phase. The knowledge capture is 
the investigative experimental process, involving interviews and protocol analysis, used to build a 
knowledge automation expert system, which consists of: 
• Using an appropriate tool to elicit information from an expert – the questionnaire; 
• Interpreting the information and inferring an expert’s underlying knowledge and reasoning 
process; and 
• Using the interpretation to build the rules that represent an expert’s thought processes or 
solutions. 
Generally, academics suggest that a knowledge automation expert system aims to learn how an 
expert’s mind works and how tough problems are conceived. It is also viewed as an engineering 
approach to problem solving using rules of thumb. Psychologists believe that rely heavily on 
modeling human cognition. Such a program normally uses rules of thumb (heuristics) described as 
logical statements to capture the decision making processes of the human expert (Awad, 2003). 
 
The goal was to design a computer-based system that could capture and emulate a human 
decision making process. A machine that can work as well as a skilled human been. However, the 
distinction is that computer software can perform only that task and cannot handle new situations 
that require innovation or intuition. Expert systems tend to be more effective than other computer 
based applications, because they:  
• may combine the knowledge of many experts in a specific field; 
• can store an unlimited amount of information, and works much faster, than a human;  
• are  available 24 hours, and can be used at a distance over a network;  
• are able to explain their information requests and suggestions;  
• can process a client's uncertain responses and, by combining several pieces of uncertain 
information, may be able to make good recommendations; and 
• can accumulate the knowledge of high level employees for any company, which is  especially 
useful  when they retire or leave company.  
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Although an expert system includes several key components (Figure 4), the essential one is the 
knowledge base - an organized collection of facts, heuristics and other information on the subject 
of a system's domain. An expert system is built in a process known as knowledge engineering, 
during which knowledge about the domain is acquired essentially from human experts. The part of 
the expert system that applies the knowledge to the problem's solving is called the inference 
engine. The explanation system explains the basis for the conclusion, reached by the expert system.  
 
The intellectual editor is a tool for correction, learning or self learning of the knowledge base. 
A friendly user interface enables inexperienced users to specify problems for the system to solve 
and understand the system's conclusions. 
 
Figure 4 - Key components of an expert system based on the judgment view (knowledge-based) of 
petroleum experts on competitive in petroleum lease acreage.  
 
Aiming to verify if this methodology could be applied to estimate the level of competition for 
E&P acreage acquisition, a method for capture expert knowledge was developed in order to build 
an expert system. 
 
The first step to build an expert system is to identify the problem domain to be solved. If the 
problem requires years of experience and cognitive reasoning to solve, or should be considered a 
judgment maker rather than a calculation processor then, the domain is a qualified candidate for 
expert system methodology. The second one, and most important, is to capture tacit knowledge by 
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knowledge developers who should have an understanding of an expert’s level of expertise (Awad, 
2003). 
 
One of the features of a knowledge expert system is to transform information into practical 
advice. Hence, it is a powerful methodology to handle complex decision making processes, as it is 
a competitive estimation for a particular petroleum licensing. 
 
Exsys Corvid® was the computer platform elected to build the expert system. It provides tree 
structures to organize related rules, and logic blocks to organize the related trees. When 
interviewing the experts, the knowledge developer should be directly related to the amount of time 
used to capture and convert knowledge into rules that computers can use. The decision making 
logic is stated by “if/then” rules, in the same way as explaining to another person how to make a 
decision. 
 
The software applied uses an "object-structure" approach to design the system. Rules are 
defined using various types of variables that have related methods and properties, providing a wide 
range of flexibility and power. Some advantages of a full object-oriented approach are provided 
without having to understand complex programming, or describing a solution with many classes. 
This is similar to the concept used in Visual Basic, widely used and accepted. The object-
structured nature of this software allows it to provide the optimum balance between power, 
flexibility and use. 
 
The software inference engine runs the rules. It supports both backward “goal driven” and 
forward “data driven” chaining, or combinations of the two approaches. Backward chaining makes 
it particularly easy to build systems. If a system has a rule relevant to the current goal or variable, it 
will be automatically found and used by the system. All developer has to do is to add the rules 
anywhere in the system. Questions will be focused, only asking what is needed, yet never 
overlooking anything that might be relevant, combining and analyzing the user information, and 
displaying the system recommendations. Probabilistic logic ("fuzzy logic") is supported with many 
ways to combine confidence factors, allowing systems to find the "best" solution, and 
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probabilistically rank multiple possible solutions. Despite this power, the inference engine is small 
and efficient. 
 
The knowledge automated expert system built as a result of this research is valid under a 
specific scenario stated at the beginning of the questionnaire to restrict the wideness of possible 
answers and different interpretations. The assumptions adopted refer to some bidding 
characteristics, as listed in Annex 1. 
 
The creation of a knowledge base consisted in transforming an expert’s knowledge acquired 
by the questionnaire into variables and rules which allow the inference engine to run the command 
block for estimating the level of competition. A total of 14 variables was defined assuming static or 
numeric values. Some of them have their values set by the user while running the software. As it is 
an automated program, it interacts with users searching for those answers. The variables 
description, including questions made by the program, is displayed in Annex 1.  
 
These variables are used by the knowledge developer to build in the “if/then” format rules. 
Each group of rules represents a logic block built according to each aspect of the licensing should 
be under analysis. In this study, five logic blocks were built: 1) petroleum price scenario; 2) 
number and profile of competitors; 3) acreage attractiveness; 4) strategic information available; 
and 5) estimation of competition level. Annex 1 also shows the name and details for each logic 
block built. Annex 2 presents the method applied specifically to the logic block 
ESTIMA_COMPET to help the knowledge developer to structure 72 logic rules, representing all 
possible licensing cases, each of them resulting in one of the three levels of competition. 
 
Once the logic blocks are built it is imperative to structure the inference engine – a group of 
commands to perform the competition estimation. Although Awad (2003) has mentioned the use of 
backward chaining as the most applied procedure while building an expert system, this study’s 
expected results were achieved applying forward chaining. Figure 5 is the image of Exsys Corvid® 
command block constructed to estimate the level of competition for the Brazilian Licensing. This 
routine ask for both variables and logic blocks, in a sequence defined by the knowledge developer, 
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to run the software using forward rules procedures to calculate: 1) the number of competitors, 2) 
the area attractiveness, 3) the effect of strategic information over competition, and 4) the level of 
competition. Any user answering the question posed by the software can fast and easily reach the 
results. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Exsys Corvid® Command block image executed while running the software. This 
routine gives the result on the expected level of competition. 
 
4. Results for Brazilian Competitive Lease Sales 
 
 
In 1997, after almost 45 years of monopoly of petroleum E&P activities performed by the 
National Oil Company - Petrobras, the Brazilian Government established a new petroleum fiscal 
regime in the country. It sanctioned the Petroleum Law 9.478/97, and also created the Petroleum 
National Agency (ANP) to regulate upstream and downstream activities. ANP adopted a 
Concession Contract model to transfer E&P from Federal Union to oil companies. The 
Government is the subsurface natural resources´ owner and concessionaires are the production 
owners. Government take and free commercialization of the hydrocarbon produced are both 
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concessionaires´ obligations and rights. This right is one of the concession model rules that mostly 
attract the oil industry attention. 
 
Since 1999, with oil prices raising, the Brazilian Government slice of petroleum revenues has 
increased and the public debt has started its decline, positively impacting the government budget, 
reaching 0.76% of the 2006 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Figure 6). According to Santos 
(2009), this is the best criterion to evaluate the success of the new institutional system established 
by the Petroleum Law. 
 
Figure 6 - Evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Government Take from petroleum 
revenues since 1994. The increasing of Government Take after 1998 reflects the change from a 
royalty tax based fiscal system to a mix of royalty, rentals, income and special participation taxes.  
 
The next section presents the results achieved when applying the methodology to the Campos 
basin licensing data base for the last 10 years of petroleum acreage lease through a Concession 
Contract model. 
 
4.1 Competition under Current Concession Contracts 
 
Define a winner offer in a Brazilian E&P acreage auction is not a simple task as it is for the 
most part of Concession Contracts lease sales worldwide. Up to the fourth licensing sale ANP 
transferred the rights and obligations of an area to the oil company which presented the higher 
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bonus value. Furtado (2004) detailed the method applied by ANP, the characteristics of the tenders 
and performed statistical analysis to estimate each tender index of success. From the fifth auction 
onwards, some adjustments were made to auction rules, where the establishment of a working 
program, the most relevant biddable factor, consequently reducing the bonus weight in the bidding 
process (Rodriguez & Suslick, 2009). 
 
The success of ANP licensing model and the political stability, fiscal incentives and low risk-
country factors lead to the promotion of two auctions for mature oilfields located onshore Brazil, 
positively impacting competition among small and national oil companies (Rodriguez et alii, 
2008). Along these ten years of acreage licensing, competition varied according to the area 
potentials, companies´ strategies, and the level of information available. Considering competition 
and the winner offers for Campos Basin, deep and shallow water areas, Furtado et alii (2008) 
presented a methodology to estimate the areas´ values that helps decision-makers define the 
bidding strategies. Focusing the same sedimentary basin, because more than 85% of Brazilian 
petroleum production come from oil and gas reservoirs found in both deep and shallow water 
areas, Rodriguez & Suslick (2008) made a comparison between Campos Basin areas´ values and 
US Gulf of Mexico winner offers, for the same period of time. The results achieved showed that oil 
companies bidding for Outer Continental Shelf areas are assigning a similar an amount of money to 
those spent by oil companies for deep and shallow waters acreage, while adding the total value 
committed as a minimum exploratory working program (PEM). 
 
Brazilian E&P acreage auctions have a different way of defining the winner offer, while 
compared to a simple bonus system applied to lease sales worldwide, where the bonus is a fraction 
of the expected monetary value (EMV) of the area. The possibility to commit PEM and local 
content, besides the signature bonus allows companies to make long term investment in the area, 
instead of committing short term cash payment. Local content accounts for 20% of the total offer 
weight and was considered irrelevant for the scope of this study. However, bonus and PEM 
account for 40% each and therefore, are a focal point defining the most competitive offer. The 
whole process of ANP licensing E&P areas is presented in Rodriguez & Suslick (2009). 
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Dealing with both PEM and signature bonus became essential for companies´ success, and 
competition analyses should be precisely performed to help decision-makers develop bidding 
strategies. Envisaging competition evaluation a hypothetical licensing scenario was built and 
presented through a questionnaire for experts involved with the Brazilian licensing process. The 
results of this evaluation are discussed in this section and an automated expert system was built 
allowing users to perform their own estimation of competition level for the defined scenario. For 
Brazilian licensing with different assumptions from ones listed in Annex 1, the expert system could 
not grant reliable results. It should be, therefore, adapted. 
 
According to experts’ judgment collected from the questionnaire some relevant conclusions 
can be reached in two main issues: a) what impacts the participation of a petroleum company in a 
particular tender; and b) how competition can be estimated using experts knowledge. 
 
Table 3 shows five parameters experts believe could impact the decision making of a company 
to participate or not in an auction. They were classified according to their degree of importance and 
will be discussed as a result of the experts’ opinions. Three, out of five parameters, were selected 
to build the rules of the expert system: (1) basin and areas on offer; (2) number and profile of the 
qualified companies; and (3) information about companies’ strategy (selling and buying petroleum 
assets). The expert system was run to yield estimation of the expected level of competition for four 
simulated licensing cases. Finalizing this section, some evidences confirming experts’ findings 
about the variable that has a negative impact on competition – potential changes on game rules - 
will be presented.    
 
Despite the Rodriguez et alii (2006) observation of a positive influence of the licensing 
period on the Brazilian 7th Licensing Round results when compared with international 2005 
tenders, around 45% experts pointed out the lower relevance of the tender period for competition 
evaluation (Table 3). Specialists (55%) reason according to their companies’ strategy, which focus 
Brazil for reserve replacement. These companies will bid for acreage independently of tender’s 
period promoted around the world. On the other hand, 63% of experts mentioned the impact of the 
licensing period on competitor’s participation on Brazilian lease, because they are not completely 
 111 
 
 
 
aware of competitor’s strategy. Maybe Brazilian tender was considered to be one among some 
potential countries for acreage acquisition for 37% of the experts. 
 
TABLE  3 - Degree of importance of some information about the Brazilian Petroleum 
Licensing 
DEGREE OF 
IMPORTANCE 
BRAZILIAN 
LICENSING vs WORLD 
LICENSING PERIOD 
OIL PROCES 
AND R/P 
SCENARIOS 
BASIN AND 
AREAS ON 
OFFER 
NUMBER AND 
PROFILE OF 
QUALIFIED 
COMPANIES 
COMPANIES’  
STRATEGIC 
INFORMATION 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
20% 34.3% 94.3% 42.9% 20% 
IMPORTANT 34.3% 54.3% 5.7% 48.6% 60% 
LESS 
IMPORTANT 
45.7% 11.4% 0% 8.5% 20% 
 
 
Almost all experts (88.6%) do believe on world petroleum prices scenarios and reserve over 
production ratio (R/P) as important criteria for competition level analyses (Table 3). The majority 
of respondents correlated the higher bids for petroleum acreage with increasing oil prices for the 
same potential acreage. This is seen as consequence of oil industry needs to enhance R/P using the 
profit from petroleum marketing as bidding budget. Chances of winning more acreage increase 
with higher bids. 
 
Regarding the areas selected by the government agency to be offered, experts were almost 
unanimous identifying this variable as the most important when evaluating competition. Knowing 
about the areas’ location makes the difference for estimating competition. If they belong to a 
mature sedimentary basin with a proved active petroleum system or to a new frontier basin, if there 
is positive results such as exploration discoveries or fields under production, and if exists flowing 
system infra-structure, besides the hydrocarbon potential of each block itself, are critical 
information for all companies. 
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ANP always set a minimum bonus value per block offered. Previously set as a constant value 
according to the location of the block (onshore, offshore shallow and deep water), since 2003 it 
varies according to the hydrocarbon potential of each block. Generally, blocks located in High 
Potential (EP) or in New Frontier areas have the same minimum bonus value per area, except for 
those which ANP’s technical and economic evaluation indicated higher EMV. However, expert’s 
opinion can be grouped into two classes: a) those who believe on the credibility of minimum bonus 
information of block’s geological potential (46%); and b) those that are not confident on ANP 
technical studies (54%). Figure 7 shows that while requested to estimate competition considering 
the existence of blocks with high minimum bonuses, 52% of experts stated that this information 
does not impact their competitive analyses if blocks are located in EP areas. Therefore, almost 63% 
of the experts considered that information to have a negative impact, reducing the level of 
competition for the blocks in new frontier areas. These results can be explained by companies´ risk 
aversion. When bidding for areas located on EP areas, companies are more confident on their own 
geologic and economic evaluation, and are aware of the petroleum system and production facilities, 
which may reduce their financial exposure. Contrarily, in new frontier areas where geological 
uncertainties and technological challenges should be first solved, companies prefer not to bid for 
blocks with high minimum bonuses values to avoid a winner’s curse. 
 
According to experts’ opinion, mapping qualified companies’ strategies and behavior are 
very important variables for competition estimation (see Table 3 for reference). Evaluating the 
bidding history of each company can help the identification of potential competitors. This is 
reinforced by analyzing companies’ behavior of buying and selling petroleum assets in the basin, in 
Brazil or worldwide. For example, one company that has never bided for Campos Basin bought its 
geological and geophysical data or acquired working interest by faming out. This potential non- 
competitor (SPC) - a company that is familiar with Brazilian licensing, but have never bid for 
Campos Basin - has an increasing interest for the basin, according to around 90% of specialists, but 
only little percentage believes SPC will not present an offer (Table 4). On the other hand, if a 
company is a well known potential competitor (CC), meaning companies that usually bid for the 
basin, although 50% of experts pointed out the increasing interest for the basin, and 40% stated 
that CC participation on the licensing is unpredictable.  
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Figure 7 - Expert´s judgment on competition impact due to minimum bonus value for both High 
Potential and New Frontier Areas 
 
TABLE 4 – CC and SPC working interest acquisition that could affect licensing 
participation 
COMPANY 
PROFILE 
EXPERTS BELIEVE ON THE 
RELEVANCE OF COMPANIES 
INFORMATION 
INCREASING 
INTEREST 
WILL NOT 
PRESENT OFFER 
UNPREDICATBLE 
PARTICIPATION 
CC > 88% 48.6% 11.4% 40% 
SPC 100% 
54.3% (high) 
37.1% (medium) 
8.6% ---- 
 
Besides companies´ activities on acquiring and selling acreage previous to a bid round, it is 
elementary to analyze companies´ international strategies, financial health and reserve figures. The 
questionnaire asked specialists about three different companies SPC, CC and NE – a company that 
has never bided in Brazil and is not used to the Brazilian fiscal system (Table 5). Regarding SPC 
profile, 43% of the experts stated they prefer to monitor its behavior and they do not expect SPC as 
a strong competitor with aggressive offers. However, respondents consider very important mapping 
NE, because although not knowing its strategy, they do believe in an unexpected aggressive 
bidding or in a strategic alliance with a potential competitor (CC). 
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Companies, despite of being SPC, CC or NE, could bid alone or in consortia according to 
their bidding strategies. Sunnevåg (2000) and Saidi & Marsden (1992) analyzed 40 years sales data 
bank of Outer Continental Shelf (US-GOM) and revealed that companies associate among 
themselves to share information and investments. So, consortium formation reduces risk of 
financial loss and aggregates geological knowledge, enhancing the possibility a consortium has to 
win acreage.  
 
TABLE 5 – Degree of importance of qualified companies according to their profile 
LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE QUALIFIED 
COMPANIES’ PROFILE VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT NO IMPORTANT 
CC 83% 17% 0% 
NE 46% 48.5% 5.5% 
SPC 14% 43% 43% 
 
When argued about this issue, 80% of experts indicated that companies also associate to 
avoid competition, besides the two above mentioned reasons. In Brazilian petroleum leases the 
number of players and the number of acreage offered differ by one order of magnitude when 
compared to US-GOM leases (Rodriguez & Suslick, 2008), which is a possible explanation. The 
low availability of acreage leads companies to jointly bid reducing the number of potential 
competitors, as well as enhancing their possibility to win some area.  
 
Trying to understand how companies estimate competition in a situation where competitors 
associate to bid, a set of specific questions were made: 
 a) Specialists were argued about how they classify information on companies’ strategies for 
a licensing. According to Figure 8, it is remarkable that information given by decision-makers is 
classified as very important (83%), suggesting that companies rely each other. This is reinforced by 
69% experts, who consider “important” all information disclosed by companies’ representatives 
other than decision makers. If information is obtained from newspaper, specialized magazines, 
among others, respondents split their opinion between “less important” (43%) to “not relevant” 
(34%), although 23% still grade as important. The explanation stands on the source of information, 
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i.e., news given by a trustful person or entity should be taken into account, otherwise is rumor, as 
well as those coming from comments raised during the licensing period. 
b) Specialists were invited to play a game for estimating competition in a scenario where 
information was released by newspapers, the acreage is the same for all cases, and are offered 
according to the same rules. Table 6 shows the outcomes for five different cases reflecting experts’ 
judgments on competition estimation when companies bid jointly. 
 
Figure 8 - Expert’s evaluation by information source. An information gave by a decision-maker is 
very important when compared with some extracted from a newspaper, for example, which is 
considered irrelevant by 34% experts. 
 
TABLE 6 – Impact of jointly bidding on competition estimation   
CONSORTIA FORMED AMONG POTENTIAL COMPETITORS COMPANIES (CC) 
CASE 
CC 
EXPERT’S 
COMPANY 
NUMBER OF 
CONSORTION 
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF COMPANIES 
NUMBER OF 
OFFERS 
COMPETITION 
ESTIMATION 
CASE 1 5 1 2 6 4 HIGH = 22 / MD* = 11 
CASE 2 4 1 3 5 2 HIGH = 15 / MD* = 14 
CASE 3 3 1 2 4 2 HIGH = 19 / MD* = 13 
CONSORTION FORMED WITH A NEWCOMER (NE) 
CASE 4 3 1 2 4 2 HIGH = 13 / MD* = 20 
CONSORTION FORMED WITH A NON POTENTIAL COMPETITOR COMPANY (SPC) 
CASE 5 3 1 2 4 2 HIGH = 7 / MD* = 26 
(*) MD – a moderate competition 
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Cases 1 to 3 are scenarios of high competition and specialist’s company is assumed to 
participate in all bids. Nevertheless, Case 2 splits expert’s opinion into high and moderate. This 
can be explained by the association of the specialist’s company with another CC, reducing 
competition as per the experts’ perception. From their point of view, as their company is jointly 
bidding with a CC they assess more information and enhance budget, mitigating competition and 
becoming a stronger competitor.  
 
Cases 4 and 5 deal with situation where newcomers and non-competitors profile, 
respectively, are also players in the bidding game. Both cases present the same conditions such as 
number of companies, consortia and offers, differing exclusively by the presence of a NE (Case 4) 
and SPC (Case 5). Experts consider a consortium formed between a CC and a NE to be a stronger 
competitor than another formed between CC and SPC. They estimate competition as moderate to 
high for Case 4 (57%) and 74% of specialists indicate an essentially moderate competition for Case 
5, when a SPC associates with any other company. This observation is in accordance to specialists´ 
opinion on SPC relevance as a player in Brazilian licensing, as previously expressed. 
 
The game, above described, directly revealed experts’ estimation of competition for a 
particular licensing scenario when there is information regarding consortium formation. 
 
Another set of questions retrieved valuable data on experts’ knowledge, later on treated to 
build the automated computer program able to infer the expected level of competition for a specific 
petroleum lease. The Corvid® Expert System resulting from this research, i.e., considering expert’s 
judgment on a variety of issues concerning historical Brazilian licensing, proved to be a powerful 
tool for non-specialists interested in analyzing competition in tenders with characteristics similar to 
those mentioned in Annex 1. Software outcomes for four bidding cases are presented in Table 7. 
 
In Case 1 user is willing to investigate competition for a lease sale with eight qualified 
companies competing with the user’s company. Four of them are potential competitors (CC), two 
newcomers (NE) and two companies with non-competitor profile (SPC). User’s company is 
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interested in bidding for blocks located in high potential sector and close to areas with recent 
exploratory successful results (variable EXPSUC_EP = yes). Recently it was announced some 
hydrocarbon discoveries in the basin, then the variable DESCBAC was set as “yes”. The results 
achieved for CASE 1 revealed a high plus number of competitors, area of very high attractiveness, 
release of strategic information that stimulates competition, leading to an estimation of a High 
competition. 
 
Cases 2 and 3 show two different licensing bid simulations, presenting the same estimation 
result - a Moderate level of competition. For Case 2, there were three potential competitors 
companies (CC) and one newcomer (NE), besides the user’s company, aiming to bid for blocks 
close to the ring fence of oilfields located in high potential areas (RFDP_EP=yes). The third 
variable that lead expert system to estimates a moderate competition was the information about a 
recent discovery in a similar play, but in another basin under evaluation by user’s company 
(DESCPLAY=yes). Despite the fact that the release of strategic information stimulates competition 
(DESCBAC=yes) in both cases, what differs Case 2 from Case 3 is the number of competitors - 
Medium level for Case 2 and Medium Minus for Case 3 (1 SPC, 2 NE and 2 CC), and the 
attractiveness of the area, which is High for Case 2 and Median for Case 3, due to the existence of 
recent results of exploratory success in new frontier areas (EXPSUC_NF=yes). 
 
The last case, Case 4, presents the bidding conditions for a Low level of competition, which 
is reached whenever the area has low attractiveness and the number of competitors is medium 
minus. It means, the block user’s company is interested in evaluating competition is located in a 
new frontier area close to ring fences of oilfields (RFDP_NF=yes) and there is no potential 
competitors (CC) qualified for the licensing round, with only 1 SPC and 3 NE.                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
This study revealed positive aspects on a petroleum lease sale that could impact competition, 
and the area attractiveness was unanimously pointed out as the most impacting parameter to attract 
companies’ attention. Nevertheless, there was one question addressed to specialists dedicated to 
assess if there was any issue they recognize as of a negative impact on lease tenders. 
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TABLE  7 –  Simulated results of expected level of competition using an expert system built from oil industry experts´ knowledge 
CENARIO_PRECO (*) TIPO_BACIA (**) NUM_COMPETIDORES ATRATIVIDADE_AREA INFO_ESTRATEGICA 
Onshore Offshore EP NF CASE 
STUDY 
<25 26<$<50 >51 
Mature 
New 
Front. 
Mature 
New 
Front. 
SPC NE CC 
EXPSUC_EP RFDP_EP EXPSUC_NF RFDP_NF 
LEGISLA DESCBAC DESCPLAY 
LEVEL OF 
COMPETITIO
N 
ESTIMATION 
2 2 4 YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
CASE 1  40    x  
HIGH PLUS VERY HIGH ESTIMULA COMPETIÇÃO 
HIGH 
0 1 3 NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
CASE 2  40    x  
MEDIUM HIGH ESTIMULA COMPETIÇÃO 
MODERATE 
1 2 2 NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
CASE 3  40    x  
MEDIUM MINUS MEDIAN ESTIMULA COMPETIÇÃO 
MODERATE 
1 3 0 NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
CASE 4  40    x  
MEDIUM MINUS LOW NÃO AFETA PERCEPÇÃO 
LOW 
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Table 8 shows that, despite the attractiveness of the acreage on sale potential changes on 
game rules are enough to create a risky environment for exploration investment. What experts do 
remark as strongly impacting the participation of any oil company, more than the possible 
presence of potential competitors or newcomers, is the Brazilian fiscal and legal environment for 
performing E&P activities. Any changes made by the Government on the fiscal system, the 
regulatory framework, or to the licensing rules, could immediately cause a retraction on 
companies’ intention to participate.  
 
TABLE 8 – Impact on companies´ participation in a licensing when the regulatory 
framework is subject to changes 
COMPANY PROFILE 
EXPERTS TRUST ON THE 
IMPACT ON COMPETITION 
HIGH POTENTIAL AREA 
(EP) 
NEW FRONTIER AREA 
(NF) 
COMPETITOR (CC) > 91% > 88% > 85% 
NEWCOMER (NE) > 94% > 86% > 86% 
 
The Brazilian petroleum lease history data presents unusual results regarding companies 
bidding for acreage on the 5th Licensing Round that could be assumed as an example of that 
expert perception. Rodriguez & Suslick (2009) pointed out that only three oil companies, 
amongst the eighties used to participate in Brazilian auctions, made offers in that licensing round 
characterizing a low competitive bid. These authors correlated this with: a) the changes on the 
fiscal system (Noel and Valentin Laws), and b) the new licensing model approved by ANP, which 
introduced new criteria to define the winner offer, and changed some technical concepts (PEM as 
biddable factor, area size, relinquishment policies, exploration phase duration, among others). 
 
Although these changes have negatively impacted competition on the 5th Licensing Round, 
the oil industry reacted positively, returning to the game in the following leases. This behavior 
can be assigned to the success of the petroleum exploration activities observed then. Some 
constrains established for the 8th licensing round, so as the number of area acquired by the same 
operator, caused its suspension sine die. Just before starting the 9th Bid Round, ANP withdrew 
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from the auction portfolio areas with subsalt potentials after Tupi wildcatd results (Berman, 
2008). These unstable procedures promoted a revision on the current auction model. 
The Petroleum Law 9478/97, in force for over 10 years, proved that auctioning acreage through 
Concession Contract agreements is a model that stimulated high risk investments in a period 
when oil prices raised from US$12,00/bbl to US$130,00/bbl. This investment in petroleum 
exploration lead to oil and gas field discoveries, such as Tupi - a super-giant oilfield - located in 
deep water Santos Basin, with pre-salt reserves estimated from 5 to 8 Billion boe (Berman, 2008). 
 
Recently, in the same geologic play and region, a series of similar potential oilfields were 
discovered, leading Brazilian proved reserves from 14.2 Billion boe to a total reserve estimated 
from 70 to 100 Billion boe. These discoveries opened a new oil frontier, motivating the Federal 
Government to review the petroleum regulatory policy to protect Brazilian oil and gas reserves. 
The proposal considers changing from Concession Contracts licensing to a Production Sharing 
Contracts, for all acreage to be licensed in areas where the pre-salt horizons occur. 
 
4.2. Competition Expectation under Production Sharing Contracts 
Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) is a petroleum exploration licensing system conceived by 
the oil industry to have the rights and obligations to explore attractive acreage in high risk 
countries, such as those located in Asia and Africa. Based on sharing all oil and gas produced 
from an area, it is a competitive licensing process as the Concession Contract.  
 
Almost all petroleum contracts in effect worldwide provide for Government Take to be a mix 
of financial revenues and production entitlement. As shown in Figure 9, countries adopt different 
contract models the most commom being PSC and Concession Contracts. Europe and particularly 
USA have more open systems for the E&P activity. Middle East is the most protectionist region. 
One of the most common legal arrangements between a Government (or its National Oil 
Company - NOC) and a private company is the PSC. The main difference between Concessions 
and PSC Contracts is that under the former the Company is entitled to the hydrocarbons before or 
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upon them being produced (Johnston, 1994). Table 9 presents more details on both models of 
contracts.  
 
Figure 9 - Map with the countries that promote licensing of exploration acreage applying 
Concession Contract and Production Sharing Contract models. 
 
Although Brazil has been successful in differentiating itself from its Latin America 
neighbors, a new regime is to be introduced through amendments to the existing Petroleum law 
(Law 9478/97), the creation of a National Oil Company (Pré Sal Petróleo S.A. - PPSA), and a 
Social Fund at a Federal level. This new legal framework should be applied exclusively to the 
pre-salt areas, being the remaining onshore and the offshore shallow or deepwater areas subject to 
the current regime. 
As this new licensing model is still under discussion and the associated regulatory policy is 
essentially different from that applied for the well known Concession Contract rules, listening to 
the oil industry experts about their perceptions on the expected level of competition for the new 
licensing model was very opportune. 
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Table 9 – Main differences between Concession Contracts and Production Sharing 
Contracts 
 Concession / License Contracts Production Sharing Contracts 
Parties Grantor = Sovereign or Government 
Agency 
Grantee = Investors and possible 
Participating Local Companies 
Principal = NOC or Government Agency 
Contractor = Investors and possible NOC 
and/or Participating Local Companies 
Fiscal System Royalty / Tax Cost Recovery / Profit Share 
Government Take Signature and production bonuses 
Royalties (5% to 10%) 
Property taxes on assets owned 
Income taxes on profits from operations 
Special participation tax varying from 10% 
to 40% according to volumes and water 
depth of the field, among others 
Signature and production bonuses 
Government share of production 
Income taxes on Grantee’ s profit from sale 
Asset Ownership Grantee owns the assets and has the duty 
to abandon and decommission 
NOC owns the assets from cost recovery 
Contractor has the right to use the asset until 
termination 
Production 
Ownership 
Grantee owns production at wellhead  Contractor is entitled to a share of 
production 
Management and 
Control 
Grantee manages and controls operations 
subject to regulations 
Grantor manages and controls according to 
regulations and approved work program 
 
All 36 experts were unanimous in referring to PSC as a familiar contract model that could 
be applied for pre-salt areas with no major effect on the contractors’ side. They recognized that 
this licensing program, theoretically, is as competitive as the concession contracts in force. 
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Among the interviewees, some reported that majors and super majors are used to explore in 
countries with PSC licensing agreements, and are familiar to Brazilian political and economic 
culture - once they are concessionaires of E&P Brazilian assets – will comfortably deal with the 
regulatory changes, and consequently, continue to compete for the pre-salt acreage. On the other 
hand, independents and regional companies should bid in a more conservative way or make a 
tight sensitivity risk analysis indicating not to present an offer in the bid process. 
 
The last question of the questionnaire was created to cover this subject. Although a 
multiple-choice question, with two "yes" and two "no" options, participants were encouraged to 
give their opinion regarding what is expected in terms of competition after changing the licensing 
policy. 
 
The statistics obtained during this enquire is shown in Figure 10. Sixty-four percent of 
experts (64%) believe that this change will reduce the level of competition, but 20% do not see 
any impact. Both 8% figures reflect a percentage of experts that prefer not to respond the question 
and those which state that there are some aspects of the policy that could motivate companies to 
compete and others that could promote the opposite effect. It means that most part (64%) believes 
in a negative impact reducing the level of competition, but 20% do not see any impact. A small 
group of experts (8%) states that the policy could motivate companies to compete or to decline 
offer. The remaining eight percent (8%) represents experts that prefer not to respond the question. 
 
Figure 10 - Result of expert´s opinion about the possible impact on competition with the possible 
change on the current licensing policy.  
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Regarding the “no” responses (20%), all experts but one, indicate the high potential of pre-
salt areas as the main factor to keep competition at similar levels of such observed in previous 
concession contracts bids. One expert believes in the maintenance of competition level because 
these changes do not significantly affect companies´ interest even when loosing rights to oil 
property and having a maximum working interest limited to 70%.  
 
In respect of the “yes” answers, which account for 64%, most of the respondents expect a 
change on the level of competition with the approval of the amendments on the Petroleum Law 
currently in force, implementing the PSC as the licensing model for the pre-salt areas. 
Nevertheless, among these experts it is possible to group participants with different opinions.  
 
Within 64%, only 10% of the experts believe on the reduction on competition due to 
restriction for hydrocarbon production entitlement to companies. Despite the majority not expects 
lack of transparency in the conduction of PSC licensing agreement among Brazilian Government 
and petroleum companies, twenty percent (20%) of the “yes” population related this negative 
aspect with a possible impact on competition level. Their opinion are supported by Cramtom 
(2005) who reported that PSCs are often associated to lack of transparency, because the 
negotiations between the Principal and each Contractor or Consortium while selling E&P assets 
are developed in different occasions. However, what reinforces the majority of participants not 
expecting any kind of collusion and/or corruption in the process of selling areas within the new 
legal framework is ANP´s ability in sale E&P acreage for the past 10 years under clear rules 
previously established, and Brazilian stable fiscal system. 
 
The large majority (70%) of oil industry representatives interviewed agreed that a change 
from a Concession Contract model to a Production Sharing is definitely not the issue when 
analyzing competition. What really could impact the level of expected competition are the rules 
adopted for the PSC structure. They are mainly concerned with two aspects of the new regulatory 
policy: 1) the power delegated to PPSA, the company proposed to be the NOC in the PSC model, 
and 2) the designation of Petrobras, a Brazilian state company which had the monopoly to 
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perform E&P activities in Brazil for around 45 years, as the sole operator for all acreage to be 
licensed under the PSC rules. 
 
Among the four amendments seeking for congress approval, the creation of a NOC – PPSA, 
which has privileges on the voting procedure for both technical and operational decisions, is 
pointed out as the detrimental aspect of the process. Moreover, another key issue raised by 
experts is the establishment of Petrobras as the unique operator of all pre-salt areas to be licensed. 
A quick wrap-up of the judgment of the 33 experts giving opinion on such subject (Figure 11), 
lead to the conclusion that Brazilian Government intention to change the licensing model, 
envisaging strategic protection of the pre-salt high oil volumes zone, is acceptable by 77% of all 
upstream companies currently searching for oil and gas offshore Brazil.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Graphic showing total 33 "yes" and "no" answers on policy changes on the current 
licensing model. "No" answers (23%) are related to the high potential pre-salt areas and to the 
working interest limited to 70%, as proposed by PSC rules. The "yes" answers (77%) as per 
expert’s opinion are associated with hydrocarbon entitlement and lack of transparency, and 
mainly with the voting procedure and unique operatorship. 
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However, the establishment of rules that could prevent them to fully operate E&P assets 
and voting against or in accordance with the consortium decisions, without the interference of a 
purely administrative company, as PPSA is supposed to be, could significantly impact the 
competition level, as perceived by experts. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Analyzing competition in a petroleum lease sale is not an easy task, and this is the reason 
why the literature to generally consider its existence as an assumption for mathematical models 
developed to define optimal bids, such that maximize revenues in a simple bonus bidding system. 
However, Brazilian licensing model is more complex and besides bonus, deal with both working 
program and local content as biddable factors. So, defining the optimal bid becomes more 
complicated, pushing companies to do a better job while evaluating competition, and helping 
decision-makers find suitable bidding strategies.  
 
This study targets to understand how oil companies’ representatives, used to participate in 
Brazilian lease, perceive competition, and also build a practical tool that could estimate the 
expected level of competition in a Brazilian tender. 
   
The first objective was reached by the development of a questionnaire applied to 36 
specialists from 20 oil companies and governmental entities to investigate specialists’ opinion 
about competition. Questions were formulated using a database built based on ANP results in the 
last eight licensing rounds in which Campos Basin acreage was offered. This method proved to be 
effective in assessing experts judgment on the main licensing variables that directly impact the 
decision making process. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that limitations on 
intelligence and perception constrain the ability of decision-makers to accurately calculate the 
optimal choice from the available information (Bazerman, 2006). The main conclusions of the 
current research project are the following: 
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• The questionnaire successfully captured experts knowledge and is robust enough to allow a 
comprehensive understanding in how specialists mind deal with technical data, strategic 
information and licensing rules to estimate competition; 
• There is no bias observed on the questionnaires answers neither per specialists business 
position nor for their companies profile. This can be correlated to past professionals 
experience of the interviewed team; 
• According to 94% of the assessed experts, what grants the success of a petroleum lease sale is 
the quality of the auctioned asset. High potential areas attract competitors interest.  Since the 
80’s Brazil is discovering giant to super-giant oilfields, attracting oil industry attention to 
Brazilian hydrocarbon potential acreage (Moraes Jr et al., 2004). This is confirmed by the 
high levels of competition for assets located at Campos Basin as shown by Furtado et al. 
(2008), exception made for the 5th Licensing Round;  
• What do really cause a negative impact reducing competition are uncertainties, not those 
related to acreage, but to the policies, as happened during the year of the 5th tender. An 
unstable fiscal system or a licensing process conducted without transparency is unanimously 
identified by industry representatives as key  that reduce the success of a bid round; 
• Almost all interviewees indicated high level of competition for acreage located in high 
potential areas or even in new frontiers, since they are prospectively sit on a sedimentary 
basin with active petroleum system, and have production flowing systems available close by;  
• More than 90% of respondents, the proper evaluation on qualified companies characteristics 
(strategies, budgets, exploration portfolio, etc), which is crucial for a calibrated competition 
estimation. Experts stated they should be aware of potential competitors (CC) movement, i.e., 
companies that usually bid in Brazil for mature basins where they already perform E&P 
activities and are qualified for the round. Companies that have never bided in the country, i.e. 
newcomers (NE), meaning not being familiar with ANP and Brazilian policies, prefer to 
associate with CC to avoid losing the bid if they make offers alone and based only in the 
symmetric information they acquired from ANP database. On the other hand, companies used 
to bid in Brazilian tenders, but acquired data for a mature basin where they never bid before 
(SPC), do not demand experts attention. They do not expect SPCs competing against CCs, 
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which has asymmetric information, but farming into opportunities in the basin, other than 
effectively participating in the licensing. 
 
The second goal was accomplished by the development of an automated expert system, using 
Corvid® platform, which works with a knowledge database build from experts’ judgment on 
competition issues that were transformed into rules. It proved to be an efficient tool, as per the 
findings obtained for the four theoretical cases implemented on the software. The expert system 
was able to properly estimate the level of competition level expected for each case, showing 
coherent outcomes when run by non-specialists. Users must be aware that this expert system was 
developed for Brazilian lease of Campos Basin acreage in a period of time when average oil price 
was US$40,00/bbl. Results may vary according to the assumptions adopted. 
 
The last conclusion refers to a current discussion about the newly proposed regulatory 
licensing policy. As shown by this study, competition granted the success of licensing promoted 
by ANP under the Concession Contract model. For licensing acreage under Production Sharing 
Contract model, specialists (64%) expect an impact in competition level due to the rules adopted 
by the government and not because of the model. PSC is a well known model applied in many 
countries worldwide, which facilitates the bid for companies familiar with its rules. In Brazil, 
experts pointed out two main reasons for reducing competition: a) the decision to have 
PETROBRAS as the unique operator for all acreage licensed, and b) the voting procedures for the 
NOC (Pré-Sal) who can reject both technical and economic issues. If the regulatory changes are 
approved as is, then competition level may be affected. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
ASSUMPTIONS ADOPTED TO BUILD THE KNOWLEDGE BASE OF THE CORVID® 
EXPERT SYSTEM 
 
Licensing 
• Brazilian tender 
• Competitive sealed bid 
• Concession contract model 
• Average petroleum price for the last two years assumed as US$40,00 / bbl 
Acreage Offered 
• On a mature offshore sedimentary basin (Campos basin) 
• On High Potential (EP) areas to reallocate national reserve and supply the growing 
domestic demand 
•  On New Frontier (NF) areas to attract investments for regions with poor geological 
information or with technological barrier 
Qualified Companies 
• Brazil is a strategic country for experts’  company investments 
• A mature offshore basin with a proved petroleum system and an existing flowing system is 
the acreage expert’s company is focusing 
• All potential competitors (new comers or companies used to bid for the basin) have the 
same strategic focus 
• All companies including expert’ s one have a similar ratio reserve per production (R/P), 
around 10 years 
 
Observation 
• The premises above listed were stated envisaging narrowing the questionnaire and keep 
experts playing the same game. It means that the rules are the same for each respondent. 
• From an amount of 26 questions, 36% of the total answers reflect competitor behavior 
under those specific premises. The other 64% of answers were used to build the 
knowledge base for the expert system been valid for all possible scenarios. 
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VARIABLES DEFINED TO BUILT THE KNOWLEDGE EXPERT SYSTEM 
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LOGIC BLOCKS BUILT AS PART OF THE KNOWLEDGE EXPERT SYSTEM 
PROCEDURES 
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ANNEX 2 
 
CRITERIA USED TO DEFINE CUT-OFFS FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
COMEPTITION ACCORDING TO ALL POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN 
NUM_COMPETIDORES, ATRATIVIDADE_AREA AND INFO_ESTARTEGICA 
VARIABLES 
 
The questionnaire first answer was used to classify and prioritize the variables that should 
be applied to estimate the level of competition. Three variables, among the five listed on Table 10 
and, as suggested by the literature, were selected to perform competition analyses. Setting values 
to: a) the degree of importance of basin and area on offer; b) number and profile of qualified 
companies; and c) to companies’ strategic information variables, was possible to calculate 
weights for these variables. The next step consisted in giving notes for each variable value, as 
seen on Table 11. A competition scale was defined multiplying weights per grades for each of the 
72 licensing cases (possibilities to combine the three variables), as shown on Table 12.  
 
TABLE 10 - Weight calculation for the variables to be used in competition estimation 
Experts judgment on variables degree of relevance for competition estimation  
Degree of 
Importance 
Licensing 
Period 
Petroleum price 
scenario and 
R/P 
Number and 
profile of qualified 
companies 
Basin and 
areas on 
offer 
Companies´ 
Strategic 
Information 
Value 
Very Important 7 12 15 33 7 9 
Important 12 19 17 2 21 3 
Less Important 16 4 3 0 7 1 
Total 115 169 189 303 112 ----- 
Rounded weight ----- ----- 1.9 3.0 1.1 ---- 
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TABLE 11 – Grades attributed to each of the three selected variable value for competition 
estimation 
NUM_COMPETIDORES ATRATIVIDADE_AREA INFO_ESTRATEGICA 
Grade Variable Value Grade Variable Value Grade Variable Value 
6 High Plus 5 Very high 3 Stimulate 
5 High  4 High 2 Do not affect perception 
4 Medium Plus 3 Median 1 Do not stimulate 
3 Medium 1 Low   
2 Medium Minus     
1 Low     
 
Figure 12 shows the level of competition scale obtained from the data presented on Table D. 
Values of 6.0 and 29.7 define the lower and upper limits of the competition level scale, 
respectively. The cut-off parameters that limit low competition level situation to moderate and 
from moderate to high are 15.5 and 22.5, respectively. These cut-offs, when applied to each 
licensing case, allow the estimation of the level of competition (Table C). 
 
 
Figure 12 – Level of competition scale built to determine cut-off parameters defining low, 
moderate and high ranges. 
 
TABLE 12 – Worksheet with all possible arrangements with the three selected variables, 
weights and grades, results and the estimation of level of competition 
    Rounded Weights       
 1.90 3.00 1.10 Competition  Expected Level 
Licensing 
Case NUM_COMPETIDORES ATRATIVIDADE_AREA INFO_ESTRATEGICA Sacle 
of 
Competition 
  Notes     
1 6 5 3 29.70 HIGH 
2 6 5 2 28.60 HIGH 
3 6 5 1 27.50 HIGH 
4 6 4 3 26.70 HIGH 
5 6 4 2 25.60 HIGH 
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6 6 4 1 24.50 HIGH 
7 6 3 3 23.70 HIGH 
8 6 3 2 22.60 MODERATE 
9 6 3 1 21.50 MODERATE 
10 6 1 3 17.70 MODERATE 
11 6 1 2 16.60 MODERATE 
12 6 1 1 15.50 MODERATE 
13 5 5 3 27.80 HIGH 
14 5 5 2 26.70 HIGH 
15 5 5 1 25.60 HIGH 
16 5 4 3 24.80 HIGH 
17 5 4 2 23.70 HIGH 
18 5 4 1 22.60 MODERATE 
19 5 3 3 21.80 MODERATE 
20 5 3 2 20.70 MODERATE 
21 5 3 1 19.60 MODERATE 
22 5 1 3 15.80 MODERATE 
23 5 1 2 14.70 LOW 
24 5 1 1 13.60 LOW 
25 4 5 3 25.90 HIGH 
26 4 5 2 24.80 HIGH 
27 4 5 1 23.70 HIGH 
28 4 4 3 22.90 HIGH 
29 4 4 2 21.80 MODERATE 
30 4 4 1 20.70 MODERATE 
31 4 3 3 19.90 MODERATE 
32 4 3 2 18.80 MODERATE 
33 4 3 1 17.70 MODERATE 
34 4 1 3 13.90 LOW 
35 4 1 2 12.80 LOW 
36 4 1 1 11.70 LOW 
37 3 5 3 24.00 HIGH 
38 3 5 2 22.90 HIGH 
39 3 5 1 21.80 MODERATE 
40 3 4 3 21.00 MODERATE 
41 3 4 2 19.90 MODERATE 
42 3 4 1 18.80 MODERATE 
43 3 3 3 18.00 MODERATE 
44 3 3 2 16.90 MODERATE 
45 3 3 1 15.80 MODERATE 
46 3 1 3 12.00 LOW 
47 3 1 2 10.90 LOW 
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48 3 1 1 9.80 LOW 
49 2 5 3 22.10 MODERATE 
50 2 5 2 21.00 MODERATE 
51 2 5 1 19.90 MODERATE 
52 2 4 3 19.10 MODERATE 
53 2 4 2 18.00 MODERATE 
54 2 4 1 16.90 MODERATE 
55 2 3 3 16.10 MODERATE 
56 2 3 2 15.00 MODERATE 
57 2 3 1 13.90 LOW 
58 2 1 3 10.1 LOW 
59 2 1 2 9.00 LOW 
60 2 1 1 7.90 LOW 
61 1 5 3 20.20 MODERATE 
62 1 5 2 19.10 MODERATE 
63 1 5 1 18.00 MODERATE 
64 1 4 3 17.20 MODERATE 
65 1 4 2 16.10 MODERATE 
66 1 4 1 15.00 MODERATE 
67 1 3 3 14.20 LOW 
68 1 3 2 13.10 LOW 
69 1 3 1 12.00 LOW 
70 1 1 3 8.20 LOW 
71 1 1 2 7.10 LOW 
72 1 1 1 6.00 LOW 
 
 
These ranges of competition supported mapping the viable licensing cases reducing 
knowledge developer work when building knowledge base rules on CORVID® expert system. 
Combination such as NUM_COMPET = high, ATRAT_AREA = high and INFO_ESTRAT = 
stimulate, do not affect perception and do not stimulate (5 – 4 – 3/2/1), presents the same 
expected level of competition, independent on the value of INFO_ESTRAT. Then, whenever a 
variable does not contribute for changing the result of expected level of competition, the 
combination was written as a single rule on the logic block ESTIMA_COMPET. 
 
Some theoretical licensing cases do not represent real situation, as per experts judgments, 
such as NUM_COMPET = Plus high, ATRAT_AREA = median and INFO_ESTRAT = stimulate 
(6 – 3 – 3). In this specific example, a situation of ATRAT_AREA = median can only occur when 
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NUM_COMPET is equal to Low, Medium Minus or Medium Plus (1 – 3 – 3 or 2 – 3- 3 or 4 – 3 
– 3). Once identified these cases, the corresponding rules were cut from the logic block 
ESTIMA_COMPET. The final structure and rules of the logic block are presented next. 
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7. CONCLUSÕES E RECOMENDAÇÕES 
Dentre os fatores que atestam o sucesso das licitações de áreas para exploração e produção 
(E&P) de petróleo no Brasil destacam-se a qualificação de um número elevado de companhias, 
que implica em competição pelas áreas, e a qualidade do portfólio exploratório ofertado que, com 
suas conseqüentes descobertas de hidrocarbonetos, atrai o interesse dessas companhias. Aliados a 
esses fatores, o baixo risco-país, a existência de um regime fiscal estável e a clareza nas regras 
das licitações promovidas pela ANP, propiciaram um ambiente mais seguro para os investimentos 
das empresas de petróleo de pequeno, médio e grande porte, gerando benefícios ao País, tais 
como o desenvolvimento de setores da indústria do petróleo e o recolhimento de participações 
governamentais, dentre outros tributos. 
O modelo de licitação competitivo selado adotado pela ANP é considerado eficiente e 
difere da maioria das licitações internacionais por prover ao governo: a) receitas “upfront” 
decorrentes do pagamento de bônus para aquisição de área; b) informações sobre as 
características geológicas das áreas e seu potencial petrolífero, resultante das atividades 
exploratórias, e comprometidas pelas companhias, como o Programa Exploratório Mínimo 
(PEM); e c) o desenvolvimento da indústria nacional a partir da oferta de um percentual de 
contratação de bens e serviços domésticos para a execução das atividades de E&P.  
Em todas as dez licitações de áreas exploratórias e nas duas licitações de áreas inativas com 
acumulações marginais observam-se movimentos de cooperação, com a formação de parcerias 
para dividir os riscos técnicos e financeiros, reduzindo, assim, o número de competidores – e 
movimentos de competição entre as firmas - onde a companhia detentora de informação 
assimétrica possui uma vantagem competitiva em relação às demais na disputa pela aquisição de 
uma área.  
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Historicamente, analisando as ofertas para as áreas da Bacia de Campos, é possível observar 
os comportamentos de cooperação e competição entre as companhias. Nas áreas de maior 
potencial geológico e nas chamadas de “golden blocks”, as companhias tendem a realizar ofertas 
associadas entre si e a oferecer valores próximos a um (1,0), que são muito maiores que as 
frações do valor monetário esperado (VME) que a literatura recomenda como oferta ótima (0,3) 
para enfrentar a competição. Para essas áreas, quantificar o “dinheiro deixado sobre a mesa” ou 
considerar a possível “maldição do vencedor” são dados sem valor para as próprias empresas e 
para a ANP, sendo apenas uma informação que revela o grau de aversão ao risco das empresas: 
alto risco x alto prêmio x alto investimento. Entretanto, para ofertas realizadas para as áreas de 
potencial geológico médio e baixo, o modelo de simulação estocástico construído mostrou ser 
uma ferramenta robusta para auxiliar os decisores na definição do bônus ótimo. A estimativa do 
valor de VME/km2 permite as firmas elaborarem ofertas competitivas para o bloco de seu 
interesse, em um cenário de alta volatilidade de preços de petróleo e incertezas nos determinantes 
do mercado. De acordo com a simetria entre os valores de VME/km2 efetivamente realizados e os 
estocasticamente simulados pode-se concluir que quanto maior o número de competidores, 
maiores os valores de VME/km2 ofertados pelas companhias, em situações em que há simetria de 
informações. Quando há assimetria, apesar de não ter sido objeto desta pesquisa, observou-se que 
as companhias menos informadas, em geral, realizam poucas ofertas, porém são mais agressivas 
nos valores apresentados. Esta metodologia pode revelar a expectativa exploratória das 
companhias, como verificado nas licitações da Bacia de Campos, tornando visível seu 
comportamento em termos de estratégias de oferta, alocação financeira de recursos e formação de 
consórcios com suas preferências. O modelo estocástico proposto pode ser aplicado para áreas em 
outras bacias, mesmo que localizadas fora do Brasil, desde que licitadas sob um modelo 
competitivo selado. 
Observando-se que os valores pagos pelas firmas para as áreas da Bacia de Campos eram, 
por vezes, elevados, efetuou-se uma análise comparativa entre estas ofertas e as realizadas pelas 
empresas para áreas do Golfo do México Americano (US-GOM), com o intuito de quantificar o 
interesse das empresas no Brasil. As licitações escolhidas para análise, realizadas em 2004 e 
2005, consideraram a existência de um mesmo cenário de preços de petróleo e potencial 
geológico das áreas. Mesmo o US-GOM, atraindo o interesse de um número de companhias de 
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três a quatro vezes maior que no Brasil, e tendo um número de áreas ofertadas entre 200 e 400% 
maior que o montante de áreas ofertadas no Brasil, identificou-se que as empresas oferecem o 
dobro do valor por unidade de área para as áreas de águas profundas brasileiras. Em 2004, as 
empresas pagaram US$55.000,00/km2 para as áreas localizadas em lâmina d´água superior a 
400m de profundidade e US$25.000,00/km2 em áreas semelhantes do US-GOM. Em 2005 estes 
valores foram US$160.000,00/km2 contra US$80.000,00/km2, respectivamente. Ressalta-se que, 
para as áreas do US-GOM os valores são obtidos dividindo o bônus de assinatura pelo total de 
área arrematada com esses bônus. Para as ofertas brasileiras esses números foram calculados 
adicionando ao bônus, o montante comprometido como PEM, após converter as unidades de 
trabalho (UT) em valores monetários. Tais números confirmam a atratividade da Bacia de 
Campos, e do Brasil, no cenário mundial de oportunidades exploratórias, atraindo assim, os 
investimentos da indústria do petróleo. 
Entretanto, para as companhias realizarem esses investimentos e adquirirem as áreas que 
atendem ao seu portfólio exploratório, ou seja, aquelas que podem maximizar suas receitas, além 
da valoração técnica e econômica da área, se faz necessária uma avaliação rigorosa do nível de 
competição esperado. 
Para estimar o nível de competição, construiu-se um sistema especialista cujo insumo foi 
um questionário desenvolvido para capturar o conhecimento de 36 especialistas que atuam como 
técnicos, gerentes, consultores, diretores e presidentes em 20 companhias de petróleo de pequeno, 
médio e grande porte. Tal questionário propiciou ainda, conhecer como as companhias lidam com 
as informações técnicas, regulatórias e estratégicas para estimar a competição, além de permitir a 
quantificação das variáveis que impactam a competição nos modelos licitatórios de concessão e 
de partilha de produção. 
Para 94% dos entrevistados o que mais estimula a competição é a qualidade das áreas 
oferecidas pela ANP, ou seja, a oferta de áreas de elevado potencial geológico localizadas em 
bacias sedimentares com sistema petrolífero ativo e dispondo de infraestrutura para escoamento 
da produção de petróleo e gás natural sugere elevada competição. Por unanimidade, o que 
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negativamente impacta a competição são incertezas do tipo regime fiscal instável e/ou falta de 
transparência nas regras da licitação. 
 O perfil estratégico, financeiro e exploratório das companhias qualificadas nas licitações, 
bem como seu histórico de atuação no Brasil (compra e venda de ativos de E&P) foi identificado 
por 90% dos especialistas como sendo a segunda mais importante variável de impacto na 
estimativa de competição. Ao se analisar a competição para as áreas de elevado potencial e de 
novas fronteiras da Bacia de Campos, 83% dos especialistas indicaram como potenciais 
competidoras (CC) as companhias qualificadas atuantes no país e que já possuem exposição 
exploratória na bacia. Entretanto, companhias qualificadas que atuam no Brasil, mas que nunca 
apresentaram oferta para esta bacia, foram consideradas por 46% dos especialistas como sem 
perfil de competidoras (SPC) por disporem apenas de informações simétricas, ou seja, aquelas 
que qualquer empresa pode adquirir do banco de dados da ANP. Segundo 14% dos especialistas, 
as companhias conhecidas como novas entrantes (NE), i.e., aquelas que nunca participaram de 
uma licitação brasileira, preferem competir em associação com as CC para terem acesso a 
informações privilegiadas (assimétricas) sobre a bacia, que lhes garanta uma vantagem 
competitiva. 
Essas percepções, adquiridas através do questionário, foram transformados em regras para a 
construção de um sistema especialista, utilizando a plataforma Exsys Corvid®, capaz de estimar 
o nível de competição para áreas da Bacia de Campos em um cenário de preço de petróleo pré-
estabelecido a US$40,00/bbl. 
A simulação de quatro casos teóricos em que se variou: 1) o tipo de área em oferta, 2) o 
número e o tipo de companhias qualificadas, 3) a existência ou não de informações sobre campos 
em produção, descobertas de petróleo na bacia ou em plays análogos, e 4) a estabilidade do 
sistema fiscal e regulatório, mostrou resultados coerentes. Além da estimativa robusta do nível de 
competição, outra vantagem da ferramenta desenvolvida é sua interatividade que permite a 
qualquer usuário não especialista nas licitações brasileiras, através de respostas a perguntas pré-
estabelecidas, conhecer o nível de competição para a área que deseja avaliar. 
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Por fim, questionados sobre o impacto da nova regulamentação do setor petróleo na 
competição pelas áreas do pré-sal, 64% dos especialistas acreditam em uma diminuição na 
competição, não pelo modelo de Partilha de Produção adotado, pois este é mundialmente 
reconhecido como válido, apesar de ser considerado pouco transparente, mas sim pelas regras 
estipuladas que conferem à Petrobras a operação exclusiva das áreas licitadas, e o poder de veto à 
companhia estatal - Pré Sal Petróleo S.A..  
Como recomendações para trabalhos futuros sugere-se: a) desenvolver novos questionários 
que possam capturar o julgamento dos especialistas em licitações brasileiras com relação ao 
cenário de preço de petróleo variável e a competição em bacias terrestres, por exemplo; b) 
incorporar as consequentes respostas desses novos questionários ao sistema especialista existente,  
ampliando seu escopo, de forma a estimar o nível de competição em outras bacias brasileiras, ou 
outras licitações mundiais, ou sob quaisquer modelos regulatórios onde exista a competição; e c) 
desenvolver modelos com base na teoria dos jogos visando definir estratégias de oferta mais 
competitivas que usam bônus e PEM, para as licitações brasileiras considerando as metodologias 
aqui desenvolvidas de valoração da área e de estimativa de competição. 
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